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ABSTRACT

Based on agenda-building theory, this study performs content analysis on 6,019
international Twitter comments about Trump and Clinton in the 10 days prior to the 2016
U.S. presidential election. Even excluding bots and trolls, the preponderance of Twitter
comments were positive about Trump and negative about Clinton, in the U.S., Russia,
India and China. In the U.K. and Brazil, Twitter comments were largely negative about
both candidates. Twitter sources and topics were also identified and explored to expand
knowledge about the evolving role and effect of agenda-building in six nations, and
iv
around the world.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“A lie will travel around the world while the truth is still pulling on his boots.”
This adage is attributed to Massachusetts representative Fisher Ames in an 1821 article in
The North American Review (although some credit Jonathan Swift from 1710:
“Falsehood flies, and the Truth comes limping after it”). At the time, of course, it took
1

months for news to travel around the world. With digital technology of the 21st century, it
now takes only a few seconds. A social media comment or video can span time zones and
borders faster than the speed of light, and with instantaneous effects on millions of
people, whether they have boots or not.
Mainstream news that was generated on Twitter was one of the central elements
of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and subsequent analysis reveals that many of the
stories were largely manipulated or totally fabricated (Stone & Gordon, 2017, Howard et
al., 2017). Republican candidate Donald Trump himself, among others, helped to drive
the mainstream media agenda with his prolific use of the social media platform, and then
propagated the notion that much of mainstream media news is “fake” (Lynch, 2016;
Viner, 2016; Maheshwari, 2016). Media coverage before, during and after the 2016
election cited previously unexplored conflicts of interest and the increased effects of
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“citizen journalists” in creating and perpetuating questionable news stories on social
media (McIntire, 2016; McCoy, 2016). These stories and social media discourses gained
credibility and traction, and doubtless affected national election results. A number of
major media stories were generated by comments on Twitter--stories that were blasted on
the headlines of mainstream media--that later were learned to have come from Russian
sources or non-credible entrepreneurs in eastern Europe (Dwoskin et al., 2017; McIntire,
2016). Vonbun, Königslöw, and Schoenbach, (2015) had found that, during elections in
particular, online media set the agenda for other mainstream media, replacing newspapers
as the intermedia agenda-setters. One political reporter at The Daily Beast said it was
vital to her job during the 2016 election: “If I’m not on Twitter for 30 minutes, I miss a
story” (Manjoo, 2016, n.p.). This merits examination of sources on Twitter about the
2
2016 U.S. presidential campaign, exploring their identity and topics, to elicit emerging
elements and to expand knowledge of this relatively new phenomenon.
Statement of the Problem
Journalists and scholars have been quick to undertake examinations and metaanalyses of the 2016 media coverage in this age of digital news feeds and national
elections (Howard et al., 2017; Gottfried et al., 2017; Stone & Gordon, 2017; Chou,
2016; Lynch, 2016; Viner, 2016; Maheshwari, 2016; McIntire, 2016; McCoy, 2016).
Media producers and writers published debriefing analyses on their election coverage,
which had been much criticized for focusing on scandals and outrage instead of on policy
and substantive issues. Recent academic studies have examined the tone and content of
mainstream media about candidates Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, which was
predominantly negative all around (Patterson, 2016), even by reporters who traditionally
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maintain objective tones in their news stories (Farhi, 2016), or whose biases may
normally be reined in by their editors. “Social media platforms such as Twitter and
Facebook give scribes a direct and unfiltered publishing platform, enabling them to
address thousands or even hundreds of thousands of followers without a meddlesome
editor standing in the way” (Farhi, 2016, n.p.). During the campaign, Twitter comments
that ranked high in negative tones were more likely to be retweeted than were positive
comments (Chou, 2016).
But in the new globalized parameters of media production, a wider lens is needed
to put such media agendas into context. While Americans contend with a new president
who says he hates the media (although he very ably manipulates it) and who sows distrust
among media consumers, other nations, observing from the outside, bring their own
3
cultural identities to such social media discourse and news agendas. Analyses of social
media content in other nations could reveal commonalities and distinctions of the themes
and topics during a contentious American election, such as whether one candidate
received more frequent or more positive coverage than the other, whether any of the
coverage was differentiated by native political infrastructures (for example, authoritarian
China may have been more receptive to one candidate than was democratic India), or
whether social media discourse generated alternative news agendas about the election
than what was observed in American media.
A wider study could also update research on agenda-building theory, whose
studies have a large gap when it comes to journalists’ and media producers’ increasing
reliance on Twitter for story ideas and sources. Therefore, the goal of this study was to
examine the Twitter comments about both candidates in the U.S. and in five key nations
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that are of prime importance to American diplomacy and international trade. Rather than
examining candidates’ tweets, this study examined tweets generated by others about the
candidates. While President Trump has shown to be a prolific user of Twitter, this study
aimed to identify the other sources who influenced his social media campaign—and
Clinton’s campaign--in order to assess whose influence emerged most frequently in
international social media: was it citizen journalists, politicians, special interests, media
companies, or international hackers? By identifying Twitter sources and tones within
each country, new factors emerge to help identify trends in the American social media
discourse that vary from those in other nations, ones which may have a different effect on
building international media agendas. This study also generates new knowledge about the
use of Twitter outside the U.S., in powerful and diverse sections of the world. In addition,
4
this study probes the legitimacy and identified specific sources with the greatest reach in
the Twittersphere, those that are most followed or retweeted by audiences.
Recent studies show the emergence of Twitter in setting the agenda for
mainstream media: “Twitter has become a convenient tool for journalists to interact with
possible sources and gather information from a vast pool of people without leaving the
office or even picking up the phone” (Lewis, Zamith & Hermida, 2013, p. 39). In a
separate study, these authors also found that non-elite sources had a growing influence
with journalists through Twitter (Lewis, Zamith & Hermida, 2015). Oxford scholar Philip
Howard and his colleagues published a study of how Twitter propagated “fake news” in
U.S. states (2017). However, there remains a gap in the literature regarding how Twitter
is employed in other nations, and whether the Twitter comments are replicated across
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borders and across cultures. As such, this study focuses on some of the largest Twitter
populations for closer examination.

5

Figure 1.1
Number of active Twitter users, in millions.
Source: 2016, Statista.com: https://www.statista.com/statistics/242606/number-of-activetwitter-users-in-selected-countries/
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Figure 1.2
Countries ranked in order of % of Twitter users in their internet populations.
Source: Business Insider: http://www.businessinsider.com/the-top-twitter-markets-in-theworld-2013-

Nations selected for this study include India, Brazil and the United Kingdom, due
to their democratic infrastructures and their history of having elected women as leaders,
which was a new issue in the 2016 American election campaign. Also, India and Brazil
are woefully underrepresented in mass communications research, and their inclusion will
help provide a foundation for growing awareness and knowledge of social media in those
nations. Also chosen to study was China, due to its important diplomatic and commercial
ties to the U.S. While China does not allow public access to Twitter, it is common
practice for Chinese journalists to use Twitter in order to disseminate official news about
6

their nation (Chin & Abkowitz, 2016). This study will expand on knowledge about how
those state-controlled media use Twitter in regards to news about the United States.
Finally, Russian entities were found to be the sources of certain media stories that
favored one American candidate over another, and the election is still being investigated
by the FBI to see how the Kremlin may have influenced this campaign
(Nakashima, Demirjian & Barrett, 2017). The Office of the Director of National
Intelligence published a report in 2017 which concluded, in part: “Putin and the Russian
Government aspired to help President-elect Trump’s election chances when possible by
discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to
him….Moscow’s influence campaign followed a Russian messaging strategy that blends
cover messaging operations—such as cyber activity—with overt efforts by Russian
7
Government agencies, state-funded media, third party intermediaries, and paid social
media users or ‘trolls’” (2017, p. ii). Some researchers and media companies have
identified that one such tactic included the use of “bots,” automated social media
accounts that are programmed to interact with other users under false identities (Timberg,
2017; Albright, 2016). This study includes Twitter comments from Russia in order to
identify the types of sources, its leading opinion-makers and to identify if the sources and
tones were similar to other nations, particularly the United States.
Not every mainstream story is generated on Twitter, of course. But in this
political event of 2016, it seemed that many were, more than in the past. The news media
itself became as much the focus of attention as the elected candidate, Donald Trump.
Communications scholar Robert Fortner said “all international communication is political
in one way or another…because they cross the boundaries of nation-states, and because

7

uncontrolled information threatens monopolies of knowledge used as the basis of
political power” (1993, p. 8). In the age of Twitter, international communication is even
more politicized. Social media once was hailed as the technological vehicle to spread
information to the people, to break up monopolies of knowledge. Instead it may prove to
be the vehicle that effectively spreads uncontrolled misinformation across boundaries in
the pursuit of political power.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this quantitative study was to study the comments, topics, tones
and sources by obtaining statistical results from content analysis of random Twitter
comments in six nations in the days prior to the election. This study employed literature
from agenda-building to identify variables and to form the basis for research questions,
8
such as which sources in each nation were most often tweeted and retweeted regarding
Trump or Clinton, and what were the most common topics of tweets for each candidate in
each nation (e.g., events, polls, policy stands, subjective attributes, affective attributes).
Moreover, results may show distinctions of agendas in nations where media are tightly
controlled by the government, in Russia and China. Women as leaders may also appear in
media agendas: Brazil and India are two emerging democracies that have elected women
as leaders, although one of them (Dilma Rousseff of Brazil) was quickly impeached and
removed from office in 2016 (Romero, 2016). While these countries, as well as the
United Kingdom, have elected women as leaders, the United States remains one of the
few democratic world powers that has not elected a woman president, although the 2016
election came close.

8

This dissertation adds to research on international communication and on agendabuilding, by identifying influential media sources in the U.S. and five other nations, with
implications for future research on agenda-setting, social media, political and
international communication and public diplomacy.
Significance of the Study
This study expands knowledge about international communications; to date, there
are few studies that compare the news media of several countries, and none that examine
the social media news feeds used by multinational journalists and consumers. Golan and
Himelboim (2016) cited the need for expanded studies into international news media. In
the age when “fake news” is generated online by teenagers in Macedonia and runs
rampant across the U.S. (McIntire, 2016), and international diplomacy may be balanced
9
on the Twitter feed of the American president himself (Lynch, 2016; Isaac & Ember,
2016), it is vital to understand the sources and practices employed on Twitter by
international sources. Most important, this study significantly broadens researchers’
knowledge of the evolving nature of agenda-building and intermedia agenda-setting in
the 21st century. Previous research focused on the theory using print and broadcast news
media. This study pursues multiple new avenues presented by the speed and scope of
news on social media, including its effects on mainstream media, from sources within
and outside the U.S. Furthermore, to date, there is minimal communications research
about the nations in the scope of this study. Guo and Vargo (2017) suggest “the
investigation of intermedia agenda setting between news media in different countries can
greatly enrich our understanding of international news flow and, ultimately, international
relations” (p. 503). While the literature reveals several studies about China, the U.K. and
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the United States, virtually no studies exist regarding the international roles of social
media in Brazil, India and Russia. Because of the scope and the subjects, findings in this
study fill gaps in knowledge about political communication, public diplomacy and
international relations, as well as expand communications scholarship in a redefining era
for agenda-building and social media.

10
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This study is rooted in agenda-building theory, which evolved from McCombs’s
and Shaw’s original 1972 agenda-setting research. Their study of the 1968 U.S.
presidential election revealed that the topics named by American voters as having
11
greatest importance were the same ones that were most covered by the news media: there
was a correlation between news media content and public opinion. Cobb and Elder
(1972) observed that when groups or organizations desired the attention of policy makers,
they used the media to highlight their issues, particularly as sources for news reporters.
McCombs and Shaw had studied the news media agenda effects on the public and policy
making; Cobb and Elder examined the effects of sources on news media producers.
Agenda-building is the appropriate theory for this research because one of this study’s
goals was to identify Twitter sources and topics that influence other media producers on
the topic of the presidential election.
Herbert Gans is a sociologist who focused on who, or which special interests,
were feeding the media with stories, declaring that sources “do the leading in the tango”
of journalists and their sources (1979, p. 116), meaning that journalists largely use
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exactly what sources provide, in the ways the sources intend. In the age of Twitter, an
overwhelming barrage of source material is delivered to journalists by the minute, to
journalists who must produce streaming news content more quickly than ever before. The
time has come to examine more thoroughly the content of Twitter due to its influence in
building a global media agenda.
Past studies about agenda-building also have focused on public relations sources,
on lobbying organizations as well as on politicians (e.g., Tuchman, 1978; Manning,
2001). For example, Shoemaker and Reese (1991) outlined what they perceived as a fivelevel model of influences in building a media agenda. These “hierarchies of influence”
include the journalist’s own knowledge, background, interests and innate or overt biases,
the routines of the practice (including use of public relations contacts, political sources,
12
and important friends), policies of the media organization, and social institutions and
social systems. Twitter and other social media have entered the realm of each of these
levels.
Cobb and Elder (1972) and Dearing and Rogers (1996) defined agenda building
as the ways in which issues are created and how they command or fail to command the
attention of decision makers, almost as an alternative to democracy wherein more of the
population is able to participate in policy discussions in the media. Lang and Lang (1981;
1983) described a reciprocal loop that builds the media agenda – from the original story
and its frames, to audience interpretation and then back to the agenda-building
journalists. For the current study, the reciprocal loop would be the media producers and
feedback on Twitter. Some agendas are determined by political-cultural values through
which the importance is judged by virtue of their proximity to consensus (Shoemaker &

12

Reese, 1991). In the case of Twitter, messages are more accessible than ever for global
populations, and the scale and parameters of “consensus” may be changing as a result.
McCombs, Shaw and Weaver (1997) elaborated on intermedia agenda-setting, finding
that people now shop for the agendas that mirror their own views.
Intermedia Agenda-Setting
Many scholars have written about intermedia agenda-setting (e.g. Vonbun et al,
2015; Brandenburg, 2002), which is when a story from one news outlet carries over to a
different kind of news outlet. Studies have shown, for example, that elite newspapers
(e.g. The New York Times) produce stories that were later covered by national television
news programs (e.g., The NBC Nightly News). Grusczynski and Wagner (2016)
identified a newer phenomenon called agenda-uptake, which is the media’s new abilities
13

to react quickly to information-seeking behavior: “Agenda-setting endures in a
fragmented era, but it is ensconced in a larger set of dynamic, sometimes fleeting,
relationships between the agendas of the mainstream media, new media, and public, with
effects that reflect the oft-fleeting nature of the modern news cycle. Agenda-uptake
applies and expands on..intermedia agenda-setting…and articulates the dynamic
relationships between the agendas of different types of news media” (p. 20). This study
explores the dynamic relationships in the age of Twitter news feeds and how they affect
the fleeting news cycles around the world.
Before Twitter, a media source was rarely an everyday citizen—or someone
posing, unverified, as a journalist--which is why there needs to be more research on
agenda-building in the age of social media. Studies are emerging about Twitter users,
such as Segesten and Bossetta (2017) who examined the 2015 British elections. Their
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study found that U.K. citizens used Twitter as a tool for mobilizing action, more than the
political parties did, but they did not examine the citizens’ role in propagating online
news stories. Twitter enables anyone, anywhere, to quickly take off as an internationally
acclaimed source, with or without media credentials. The lines between professional
journalist, engaged citizen and online prankster are difficult to discern on the internet,
especially across international datelines. In addition, Shoemaker and Reese (1991)
concluded that the agenda-building process has an important fifth step, which is “cultural
considerations.” If it is an American news outlet, for example, the journalist will put a
story into context that will be appreciated and understood by the ones who will consume
it in America. A news outlet in another culture may present a story in a way that makes
sense to that international setting: change the tone, exclude certain details, and so forth.
14
But the cultural context may be misconstrued by other nationalities, all of whom are still
learning to negotiate credibility and effective news on Twitter.
This researcher performed a study in 2016 which examined how often the Twitter feed
from television talk show host Ellen DeGeneres was picked up by news media in other
formats. It was found that, in one year, television news shows at ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN
and Fox broadcast 251 Twitter comments from “The Ellen Show,” which included clips
from her TV program. In addition, local TV and radio news websites used DeGeneres’
Twitter feed 1,291 times in that year (O’Boyle, 2016). Other research has found that
emerging media (such as political blogs and partisan news websites) are now more likely
to set the agenda than traditional news outlets (Meraz, 2011; Vargo & Guo, 2016).
Mainstream news media are picking up on stories from entertainment media and partisan
websites, and content analysis of other Twitter data may reveal how much some of them
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are relying on content from individual consumers for news stories. Twitter encompasses a
sort of conflation of intermedia agenda-setting and agenda-building, which is another
reason it merits further study. McCombs, Lopez-Escobar and Llamas (2000) clarified
attribute agenda-building, which they called second-level agenda-building. By then,
agenda-setting already had been separated into two levels, including attribute salience.
McCombs, Lopez-Escobar et al. (2000) revealed that such attribute salience was part of
agenda-building as well. Their research concluded that agenda-building went beyond
mere object salience transfer (or first-level agenda-building) and also introduced attribute
salience to journalists (second-level agenda-building). This attribute salience may be
subjective (focusing a news story on issues, a politician’s integrity or personal history), or
this attribute salience may be affective (inserting a positive or negative valence or tone
15
into story details). The authors describe how attribute salience influences object salience
in agenda-building, and this has been confirmed in a number of more recent studies. For
example, Kiousis et al. (2006, 2009) found that attribute salience made a difference in the
media agenda during statewide elections in the U.S. Positive and negative tones often
exist in news sources, whether the journalist acknowledges them or not. Agenda-building
of attributes starts with where a journalist obtained the information, and that place is
more and more often on Twitter. Who is using Twitter? What are Twitter comments
saying or showing in pictures? How popular are the comments and commentators (i.e.,
how much are they “retweeted)?” How much of Twitter is reaching and being recycled
by mainstream media on Twitter?” Denham (2010) argues that agenda-building is a
constant negotiation between sources, and more studies are needed.

15

Barack Obama was the first U.S. presidential candidate who relied on Twitter to
maximize his campaign exposure and platform, in 2008 and 2012 (Kiousis et al., 2015).
In 2016, the landscape shifted to emphasize social media—and particularly Twitter—
more than any presidential campaign in history. Twitter entered a new stage of influence
on mainstream media, not only by its use and participation by the candidates themselves,
but by others who manipulated all the media channels, who generated messages that
mainstream outlets were using “fake news” and unidentified sources which, in many
instances, they were themselves. Candidates Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump are
strong topics to measure as they were well-covered by media in multiple countries,
allowing for a compare and contrast of Twitter sources and content on an international
scale. Other researchers may examine the texts from the candidates themselves, but this
16
study focuses on the messages and influence of others, and how they varied from one part
of the world to the next.
Agenda-building and International Media
When it comes to agenda-building in international relations, some agendas are
created by the cultural and political distance between nations as reflected in the media’s
organizational needs and values—i.e., trying to gain readers through engaging and
entertaining stories (Gitlin, 1980; Chang, 1998; Entman, 2008). The success of media
stories often relies on story relevance, audiences, and political and communication skills
(Bennet, 1990; Entman, 1993; Pan & Kosicki, 2003; Sheafer, 2001). Sheafer and Gabay
(2009) found that the success of one country in promoting its agenda in foreign media “is
a function of the cultural and political congruency between itself and the target country”
(p. 463). They found a high correlation between the U.S. government agenda and the U.S.
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media, as well as the U.K. government and the U.K. media (Sheafer & Gabay, 2009),
indicating there is significant influence from individual governments over their own
media. “The more the initiated event correlates with news media values (e.g., dramatic,
emotional, and negative events) the more the initiator succeeds in promoting its agenda”
(p. 463). In addition, “news media do tell people what to think by providing the public
with an agenda of attributes—a list of characteristics of important newsmakers” (Wanta,
Golan & Lee, 2004, p. 364.); Wanta, Golan and Lee (2004) found news coverage about
another country has direct influence on U.S. public opinion of that country, and also that
news about many nations, such as India, was virtually non-existent in the U.S. for many
years.
Wanta and Hu (1994) found that agenda-building is comprised of the choices
17
made by journalists to cover some issues over others, and they studied how these choices
were shaped by outside forces, such as politicians and corporations and, now, by Twitter
conversations (Parmelee, 2014). International news exposure was found to be
significantly related to positive feelings about a target nation (Salwen & Matera, 1992).
Ramanathan (2016) identified a “vulture mentality” in international news media when
reporting on crises in developing countries, but found that international media were less
biased when reporting about a country not their own. Guo and Vargo (2017) found that
online news sources covered wealthier nations more frequently than less economically
powerful ones. This study examines how Twitter plays a role in various international
media settings. Media discourse is determined by the dominant culture and therefore
“presents the news within a framework of certain values” (Kennedy & Hills, 2009, p. 75),
so it is important to interpret the meaning of the journalists’ choice of sources between
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nations. For example, there have been legislative and judicial demands to investigate the
role of Russia’s intervention in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. One popular Twitter
account called Patriot News was operated out of Great Britain by an avowed proponent of
Russia President Vladimir Putin, and declared its mission was to spread “devastating
anti-Clinton, pro-Trump memes and sound bites” (McIntire, 2016, n.p.). Another Twitter
source called “Just Trump It” also was operating out of Russia, according to the Atlantic
Council Institute (McIntire, 2016, n.p.). This study examines the tones and sources of
Twitter messages about both American candidates from Russia, and from other nations,
providing formative research that may or may never emerge from investigative
committees or federal agencies. Certainly, in 2016, the Twitter stories about the
presidential campaign were dramatic, emotional and negative. This study examines how
18

these attributes varied from one nation to the next, and whether messages may have
crossed borders because they were more dramatic and emotional.
Second-level agenda-building examines the salience of affective attributes such as
positive, negative and neutral tones, story frames that can influence public opinion. Many
scholars have found that this type of agenda-building often makes its way into the media
agenda, such as Kiousis and Wu (2008) who found that the efforts of public relations
counsel was associated with a decrease of negative news coverage regarding affective
attributes about a foreign nation. This second level is explored in this study as well, and
reveals sources who influenced negative media coverage about the U.S. in other nations.
Golan and Himelboim (2016) noted how social media provide world governments with a
platform to disseminate news directly to the public. They used World System theory to
study how this has undermined the traditional one-way flow in Russia, China, and the
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Middle East, and how non-institutional sources on social media bridged news sources and
audiences in a way that was once the sole purview of elite news sources. This study
explores sources and content from multiple countries to expand on such knowledge. For
example, it is acknowledged that Chinese government authorities block Twitter from its
citizens, but they permit journalists to use the feed in order to specifically disseminate
positive images and stories to overseas media (Chin & Abkowitz, 2016). As such, the
tones and topics of Twitter comments about the U.S. election from China will serve as an
insightful lens into the goals of its government regarding the leadership of its rival world
power.
Agenda-Building on Social Media
Like Facebook, Twitter was created in the late 2000s and took off around the
19
globe after the introduction of the smartphone in 2007. Scholars are still catching up with
Twitter studies, many of which focus on adoption, technology, and some about politics
and social movements (e.g., Fahmy et al., 2012, on the Egyptian uprising), and qualitative
studies on how journalists use Twitter as a news source (Parmelee, 2013; 2014). Some
scholars have found that social media such as Twitter is changing the traditional roles and
practices of journalists (Bruno, 2011; Hermida, 2010, 2012; Holton & Lewis, 2011;
Lawrence et al., 2013; Molyneux, 2015). Many news companies now encourage or even
require their reporters to use Twitter as part of their professional responsibilities
(Lawrence et al, 2013; Gleason, 2010; Greer & Ferguson, 2011; Lowery, 2009; Picard,
2009). Some researchers have found that journalists often use Twitter more frequently for
expressing opinions, editorializing, and personal insights rather than for straight newsreporting (Lawrence et al., 2013; Lasorsa et al., 2012; Hermida, 2010). Lee et al. (2016)

19

examined the political ideologies of journalists in South Korea and found that reporters
from liberal media outlets used Twitter with much more frequency than those from
conservative media organizations, and they used it not only to convey news but to
interact with the public even more than to interact with their friends.
The 2016 American election saw the insurgence of conservative social media
“bots,” programs that automatically retweeted Twitter comments by the thousands, from
conservative sources such as Fox News’ Sean Hannity, GOP strategist Karl Rove,
Senator Ted Cruz, and a small army of independent conservative activists (Timberg,
2017; Albright, 2016). These automated Twitter accounts are generally used by
conservative sources, and are known to be used in at least 17 countries, creating what was
called by Oxford Internet Institute professor Philip N. Howard as “a synthetic
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conversation” instead of a real public conversation, one that makes it “very difficult to
know what consensus looks like” (Timberg, 2017, n.p.). Even before Election Day 2016,
one study had found that about 15% of Trump’s social media followers were bots (FoxBrewster, 2016) and another study had found that 33% of Trump’s positive hashtags were
generated by bots, compared to 22% of Clinton’s positive comments (Kottasova, 2016).
Many of these tweets from bots commonly are deleted within hours or days—up to 20%
of them—and are no longer accessible, making it difficult for researchers to reproduce
results (Liu, Kliman-Silver and Mislove, 2014). However, researcher Howard said: “If
you removed all the bots, it would seem that Trump is still more popular and has more
traffic” (Kottasova, 2016, n.p.). Some have suggested that Russia used social media in
this way as a dangerous new route for manipulating public opinion and undermining the
credibility of democratic governments (Calabresi, 2017).
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Much of the 2016 election media agenda was dominated by events relating to an
email hack of Clinton’s campaign manager as well as of the Democratic National
Committee (DNC) during the summer, some of which were published widely and
reflected party in-fighting, as well as donations from foreign individuals. The Washington
Post reported that Russians were responsible for the hacks, although a Romanian hacker
called “Guccifer 2.0” tried to take the credit and draw attention away from the Russians.
But independent research firms quickly confirmed it was the Russians behind the hack,
and that it was they who gave the email files to Wikileaks (Vitkovskaya, Granados &
Muyskens, 2017), although founder Julian Assange denied the source was Russia. On
October 7, a video emerged from “Access Hollywood” of Trump making lewd comments
about women; within an hour, Wikileaks released thousands of new emails that had been
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stolen from John Podesta, Clinton’s campaign manager.
However, Benkler, Faris, Roberts, and Zuckerman (2017) found that the 2016
election media agenda was driven not by Russians but by Breitbart News, whose
influence created a common mainstream media agenda that reflected Trump’s preferred
themes, particularly immigration topics, attacks on Hillary Clinton, and misleading
messages (or “fake news”) about the integrity of all media that opposed him. Fake news
are stories that distort or invent facts, and are usually created by websites or producers to
appear credible at face value. Fake news was shown to influence partisan media in 2016
(Silverman, 2016; Vargo, Guo & Amazeen, 2017). Other studies have indicated that
digital tools such as Twitter need further study to advance knowledge of information
subsidies (Waters, Tindal & Morton, 2010) and its function as an agenda-building tool in
elections (Woolley, Limperos & Oliver, 2010). This study explores the information
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subsidies—from Breitbart and beyond--during the 2016 election as they appeared on
Twitter, to expand research beyond the effects of partisan media, but also to examine how
agenda-building on Twitter reaches a global audience. Previous agenda-building studies
have not focused enough on the international implications of such information subsidies
on Twitter.
International Twitter Comments and Cultural Context
Some studies have examined agenda-building using the principle of public
diplomacy. Park and Lim (2014) examined public diplomacy through social media in
South Korea and Japan, and network analysis revealed Japan had more diverse sources
but that Korea more successfully engaged the public on social media. Twitter provides
insight into the varied social media practices of each culture in their respective feeds.
22
Hall (1976) and Hofstede (1993) described distinctions between high-context cultures
that rely on subtlety in communication messages--as their citizens have societal values
that are collective in nature--and low-context cultures, which value individualism above
all else and need messages to be clear and explicit. The nations represented in this study
represent both types of cultures, and analysis of Twitter use about the same topic may add
to knowledge about the effects of boundless social media on existing cultural structures.
For example, Twitter itself is a decentralized low-context environment, where trust is not
built up over time and messages are often rapid and explicit. But it may be a place where
a low-context culture such as the U.S. finds itself acting as a collective, rising up together
as a Twitter population to address a particular social issue, one that also crosses borders
and merges with a similar movement in another nation, creating group identities that
would not exist without social media. This study explores whether the Twitter
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environment encourages more independence or interdependence among citizens of the
globe, who may or may not be stakeholders in the issue of focus.
There may be some limitations to studying Twitter, but it does have advantages
over other platforms such as Facebook (which is private), and Snapchat and Instagram
(which do not have hyperlinks or the capacity to share or “retweet” messages, images and
websites). Twitter effectively provides infinite exponential exposure for a story well
before the “truth has pulled on his boots.” However, Twitter users are a self-selecting
group and may not be representative of the nations or their media. Twitter is a platform
that allows for public access and analysis, but there is room for manipulation that may not
be easily identified, as mentioned earlier about the “bot” accounts that are quickly deleted
after posting messages. The self-reported identities and motivations of actual users on
23
Twitter also present a challenge. There is a public profile on Twitter which identifies who
each user is, with a small biography. For the most part, journalists are identifiable on
Twitter because it is in their professional interest to be straightforward. Journalists want a
lot of followers, they want to show their bosses how popular they are, and to introduce a
story that may gain traction and get picked up by other media (Parmelee, 2014). Some
journalists are better known (and respected) than other journalists but lesser-known news
writers from smaller markets are talented and also have large followings. A potential
weakness of studying Twitter based on agenda-building is the fact that there may be
other, simultaneous channels through which news stories are created and proliferate. And,
of course, professional journalists have a roster of reliable sources and public officials
who are not reached through Twitter. In other words, journalists who build the agenda
have many sources other than Twitter and various social media.
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Another challenge of examining Twitter is the “echo chamber.” McCombs and
Shaw (1997) described how consumers started to seek out the news they prefer to hear
from a selection of cable channels, news that agrees with their own perspectives. The
arrival of social media in the late 2000s created even more of a personalized news feed
for every individual who wants to block out stories they won’t like. This condition may
reveal that the agenda-building that occurs on Twitter is mainly a feedback loop in a
filtered bubble, with little or no exposure to followers who are not like-minded. In fact, a
recent study by MIT Media Lab found that 20% of all election-related Twitter comments
about the election came from people who only “follow” Hillary Clinton or who only
“follow” Donald Trump, not both of them (Chou, 2016). This same study found that
Trump followers on Twitter largely made many more comments than Clinton followers.
24
By adding a larger international component to this study, such filters are more easily
revealed, in addition to insights about American agendas in media systems around the
globe. Of course, this particular shortcoming is not restricted to Twitter studies—this
limitation would occur in studies of television news broadcasts as well as print news.
Twitter is sorely in need of more academic studies. Other studies in agendabuilding, in the era before Twitter, had to rely on data such as press release content
analyses and journalist interviews. Social media and digital tools that seek out keywords
for analysis enable researchers to expand on knowledge of this theory. Agenda-building
is evolving as new media evolves, as the public not only chooses its preferred media
outlets but also participates in them. Twitter feeds and news sites engage consumers;
indeed, they recruit consumers as (unpaid) sources of news and features. Someone who
photographs an alligator on the street may see it blasted on national media the next day,
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then transformed into a Twitter meme about Hillary killing animals to make new shoes.
The extent of citizen-generated content can be compared and contrasted with its re-use
(retweets) by journalists, in the U.S. and in other countries who also use Twitter for
agenda-building. This is only one aspect which can be explored within the many research
opportunities afforded by Twitter. There may be limitations to Twitter data—including
the simple fact that randomized samples will be a small proportion of the total—but it is a
rich resource for agenda-building studies of the 21st century. Twitter demands study
based on agenda-building, to build knowledge about news-making as well as knowledge
about the theory itself.
Research Questions
Donald Trump always has had more Twitter followers (17.1 million) than Hillary
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Clinton (11.6 million) (Twitter.com, 2016). The Shorenstein Center on Media at
Harvard’s Kennedy School (Patterson, 2016) and the MIT Media Lab (Chou, 2016)
found that mainstream American news coverage—print, broadcast and digital--of both
Clinton and Trump were “overwhelmingly negative in tone and extremely light on
policy” (Patterson, 2016, p. 1). Trump’s coverage was 77% negative, and Clinton’s
coverage was 63% negative. The Shorenstein study found that the press was not
necessarily biased in favor of liberal positions, but that it was biased in preference of
negative tones. The coverage of Trump was always greater than coverage of Clinton,
throughout the 2016 campaign. The Shorenstein study also found that most topics in the
news were about the “horserace,” i.e., who was ahead in the polls (42% of stories),
followed by other topics (personal qualities, leadership experience, 24%), controversies
(17% of stories) and policy stands (10%). This was in keeping with studies of
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mainstream media sources in previous presidential elections. The author proposed that
negative coverage has a leveling effect that opens the door to “charlatans” and
indiscriminate criticism that can blur the distinctions between earnest politicians and
pretenders, between issues of valid concerns and inconsequential ones—the proliferation
of false equivalencies. Another Harvard study examined both mainstream and social
media coverage of the 2016 presidential candidates and found largely negative stories
about both candidates, but that the media agenda itself focused mostly on Trump’s
signature issue, immigration, and that the leading media of conservative consumers were
highly partisan and relatively new media outlets, such as InfoWars, Fox and Breitbart
(Faris, Roberts, Etling, Bourrassa, Zuckerman & Benkler, 2017). Negative news erodes
trust in the press, currently at its lowest level since such polling began decades ago
26
(Patterson, 2016).
While it may be true that American Twitter users shared the same tones as
mainstream media, it may be different for users in other countries. For example, Russia is
being investigated by multiple agencies for having used Twitter commenters to cast favor
on candidate Trump (Rupar, 2017), thus the tones may be more positive for Trump in that
nation. This study will examine whether Twitter comments were negative, neutral or
positive, and compare the differences between the six nations.
The MIT Media Lab “Electome” post-election study in 2016 revealed that overall
negative comments were more likely to be retweeted than were positive comments
(Chou, 2016). The study found that the correlation of negative words in stories shared by
Donald Trump followers were three times more frequent than non-Trump followers.
However, Donald Trump followers also were less likely to follow mainstream media
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Twitter feeds, meaning the online world of Trump fans did not interact with mainstream
media online as much as Clinton followers did. Most research on international media
coverage are studies based on framing theory and that focus on issues relating to
terrorism and war (e.g., Elena, 2016; Yarchi et al, 2013), on natural or man-made
disasters (e.g. Jiminez-Martinez, 2014; Wang et al, 2013; Pal & Dutta, 2012; Kim & Lee,
2008), and a very few focus on cultural distinctions between media sources and subject
nations (e.g., Ramanathan, 2016; Sobel, 2015). The MIT post-election study identified
the most common topics among Clinton and Trump followers, which were 1) gun rights
2) racial issues 3) immigration 4) terrorism 5) jobs 6) economy and 7) education. Some
of these topics—e.g., immigration, terrorism—may be of greater interest in international
markets. However, post-election news media and law enforcement suggest that some
27
Twitter users attempted to influence American people and the election results.
Ramanathan (2016) found that international news coverage from a proximinal or
same-language nation contained more positive tones than neutral tones. While studying
multi-national news coverage of several Malaysian airlines accidents, the author found
that local and international media “do reflect and mirror the various cultural factors that
impinge upon the production and dissemination of news” (p. 32). Joye (2009) found that
western media were more apt to normalize portrayals of inequalities among global
cultures, thereby consolidating global power hierarchical relations. Walter (2016)
reported on the characteristics of European countries and the propensity of EU member
nations to report about one another. She found that countries that had proximity or that
spoke the same language were more likely to report about each other. This has not been
examined in relation to social media, nor on a more global parameter. Considering that

27

the English language is spoken in the United States, further examination may show that
Great Britain will have the next largest volume of tweets about Trump and Clinton and
the 2016 election. Like the United States, India is a former British colony and has an
English-speaking population of more than 250 million people, in what is now the world’s
largest democracy (Times of India, 2010). This number may be only a small portion of
India’s total population, but it is far greater than the English-speaking population of Great
Britain (63.2 million). In spite of being a “high-context” nation (Hofstede, 1993; Hall,
1976), India may demonstrate proximity with the U.S. through the volume and number of
Twitter comments about the American presidential candidates in 2016. Indeed, a recent
study by this author revealed that government sources and diplomats largely and
positively tweeted about India and the U.S. during reciprocal state visits in 2014 and
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2015, as much as or even more than mainstream media did (O’Boyle, in press). The
present study will expand on cultural aspects of international agenda-building by
examining the effects of language on social media content. In addition, this study
examines sources on Twitter from each nation, to further explore the influence of
government representatives and others in the agenda reflected in social media.
Like language, political events and media influences in each nation contribute to
the agenda, in nations where Twitter comments from any source can be retweeted,
acquire legitimacy and subsequently influence other mainstream media. There is a gap in
research when it comes to social media and international agenda-building. For example, a
democratic nation which has had women elected as leaders (such as India, Great Britain,
and Brazil) or those from member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) may have different social media agenda than an authoritarian regime such as
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China or Russia. Fisk, Fitzgerald and Cokley (2014) explored international media frames
about nanotechnology innovations and found that Asian media focused on the health
benefits and economic benefits of such research, while American media focused on its
benefits for the environment, and British media focused on risks such as cancer and lung
diseases associated with nanotechnology. Most research has focused on international
agenda-building in print and broadcast media. Wang, Lee and Wang (2013) wrote about
how China media has both political and economic incentives when they report on
international news, particularly because the Chinese government is “keen to promote the
image of China in the international arena…to build up soft power and to counter
perceived dominance in international communication by western media organizations”
(p. 897). Xiang (2013) found that international English-language social media largely
29
depicted China as a rising economic and technological power, comprised mostly of
retweets from mainstream media agenda-setters in the U.S. and U.K., largely positive or
neutral except for a few mentions of authoritarianism, human rights and pollution. But in
China itself, as found by Zheng and Huang (2016), international news is still tempered by
ideological policies of the state.
Park, Wang and Pinto (2016) used indexing theory to compare the content of
German and American media about post-Fukushima nuclear news, and found that
German news focused on the themes of increasing safety regulations and establishing
non-nuclear energy sources, while Americans focused not on diverse debate but on
themes of natural disaster and failure of Japanese infrastructure. This media coverage
mirrored each government’s views and respective politics regarding nuclear power. The
researchers recommended that American journalists use more foreign sources in their
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reporting, to deepen perspectives and to provide more balanced political debate. Park
and Lim (2014) used network analysis to compare social media public diplomacy from
Korea and Japan, and found that Japan sources used more images and videos on social
media than they did text, and that both countries’ communications were engaged largely
by non-natives, in particular by those in Europe and the U.S. Golan and Viatchaninova
(2014) compared the contents of the Russian government’s advertorials (editorials as paid
advertisements) in major Indian and American newspapers, and found that the most
prominent agenda these propagated were related to economics, international relations,
and arts and culture. The Russian government emphasized its global power more
frequently in Indian newspapers than they did in the American papers, and the authors
found that such print advertisements—even though they are paid media—are capable of
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being adapted for different nations and therefore play a vital role in a government
successfully framing its policies to international audiences. Among its many media
services, Twitter is now also a platform for placement of such “paid editorials” and
propaganda, and this study may expand on previous research regarding government
agendas created for international audiences.
In addition, images are sometimes used on Twitter posts, and they are processed
more quickly than words. For example, in the 2008 presidential primary, Hillary Clinton
tweeted a photo of her opponent, Barack Obama, wearing a turban (Grabe & Bucy,
2009), which implied he may be of African or Muslim heritage. Such image “bites” are
as persuasive as words, or even more so, on Twitter. Grabe and Bucy (2009) suggest that
future research should focus on coding images of politicians for character frames that
include “the ideal candidate” (photos including symbols of patriotism, or candidates
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hugging children) “the populist campaigner” (showing celebrities or large audiences), or
the “sure loser” (finger-pointing, small crowds). These image characteristics are
equivalent to story tones as candidates fight for control of the media tones and topics.
While this study gathers data about the frequency of images used in Twitter comments, it
does not code the image contents themselves for affective variables. They are included
here because Twitter messages are brief; accompanying images may serve to affect the
overall tone of the messages.
The Oxford Internet Institute published a data memo in 2017 that examined
hashtags and links on 7 million Twitter comments in the U.S. during the ten-day election
period. They found that American Twitter users shared as much “junk news”—
polarizing, conspiracy and false information—as they did legitimate mainstream news
31
stories. It was also learned that Russia operated hundred of fake accounts on Twitter and
Facebook that clearly propagated positive information about Trump and pushed
unverified stories from Wikileaks about Clinton (Dwoskin et al., 2017; Fandos & Shane,
2017). Building on this knowledge, this researcher studied the Twitter content of six
nations, using actual content analysis rather than hashtag analysis with digital data
programs, and extended the sample to reach around the globe into several nations and
their Twitter populations. Content analysis also allowed for measuring the tones of the
comments with greater detail and reliability than previous Twitter studies. As an
exploratory study of agenda-building on Twitter from around the world during the 2016
U.S. presidential campaign, this researcher posed the following research questions:

31

RQ1: Who are the predominant sources in the U.S., U.K., Brazil, Russia, India
and China that posted the most frequent Twitter comments about candidates Trump and
Clinton in the ten days prior to the 2016 U.S. presidential election?
RQ2: What is the nature of the content of these Twitter comments about Trump
and Clinton, in terms of topics, images and tones?
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CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

The international agenda-building about Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton was
studied through content analysis of Twitter comments from six nations: the U.S., U.K.,
Brazil, Russia, India and China. The Twitter comment (or tweet, including any featured
image) was the unit of analysis, and the content analysis was the counts of key categories
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and measurements of the variables, which are described below. The analysis focused on
manifest content, such as sources and topics, as well as latent content, looking for
affective tones by using variables such as mentions of “liar” or “crime.” Content analysis
for Twitter includes form attributes or what Neuendorf (2002) calls “formal features,”
message elements that are unique to the communications platform, such as hashtags,
abbreviations and images.
The nations under study were selected based on volume of Twitter users (see
Figures 1 and 2 on page 6 and page 7), as well as by their ranking among the world’s
largest economies and by representing both democratic and authoritarian governments.
The democratic governments aside from the United States (i.e., U.K., India and Brazil)
have also elected presidents in the past who were women, and this was a novel
characteristic of the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign. Russia was included as it is the
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focus of U.S. federal investigations for potentially using social media to influence the
American election.
As this particular agenda-building would have been made in the language of
Americans, this study is limited in scope to Twitter comments made in the English
language. This is true for all the nations under study, as coding in other languages is not
only cumbersome, but non-English tweets might limit the capacity for the content to
cross borders and cross cultures, and may fail to influence the international media
agenda. This language restriction to English may be a minor limitation and, for this
study’s purpose, the sample is still quite revealing. Other studies of social media in
international environments have examined English-only comments because it is the
dominant language of social media around the world. For example, Xiang (2013) looked
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at how international social media in the English language—including Facebook and
Twitter--framed images of China to the global public. Gurman and Ellenberger (2015)
studied English-language international tweets for a study in crisis communication after
the 2010 Haiti earthquake. The use of English language facilitates the potential reach of
comments for this particular event, i.e., someone’s comments in English are more likely
to be read by actual Americans. Twitter is a very limited platform however (only 140
characters) and does not require perfect language skills, so non-native speakers may feel
it is easy to post a message or even merely a candidate’s name with an exclamation point.
Park and Lim (2014) found that Japanese users of Facebook often used English language,
as those users were “targeting domestic users along with the foreign public on social
media” (p. 91).
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Data Collection
The data for this study encompass Twitter comments, sources, message contents
and tones for a total of 6,000 Twitter comments in a 10-day period, leading up to the
2016 election. This data were compiled and randomly selected by Sysomos Media
Analysis, a social intelligence engine that collects data from online social media around
the world (Jang, Park, & Lee, 2016). This study focused on individual tweets produced
between October 30 and November 8, 2016. Originally, the target sample dates ran
through November 9, but pilot coding revealed that every tweet after Election Day
(November 8) was positive in tone for Trump and negative for Clinton, as this reflected
the election results. Including the day after the election skewed the overall tones in favor
of Trump, so the sample was changed to exclude November 9. These dates immediately
35
before the election date (November 8) were when Twitter volume was high, and
excluded post-election coverage of Trump’s victory. Other coding adjustments made
after the pilot coding are discussed in the sections below.
Only English language tweets that contained the keyword “Trump” or “Clinton”
and that originated from the six nations under study (U.S., U.K. Brazil, Russia, India,
China) were included in the search. Retweets themselves were excluded, as the study
aimed to examine which sources were creating the agenda, not duplicating one from other
sources. Thus “and NOT RT” was included in the keyword search on Sysomos. Five
hundred tweets were selected from each country using the keyword “Trump,” and five
hundred more were selected from each country using the keyword “Clinton.” The
selection of random sub-samples for analysis came from the approximate tallies listed in
Table 3.1
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Table 3.1
Number of Twitter Comments for Each Candidate
About:

Trump

United States
United Kingdom
India
Brazil
China
Russia

12,888,880
675,900
184,330
324,600
27,700
18,400

Clinton
6,093,110
291,200
103,510
11,400
15,100
11,400

Using systematic sampling, a manageable quantity from each country of 500
tweets about each candidate was selected, to reach the goal of 6,000 total Twitter
comments posted about the candidates in the days immediately prior to the 2016 U.S.
36
presidential election. Sysomos generated a random sample of 3,000 tweets for each
keyword in each country, which were downloaded into Excel files. The researcher chose
every sixth tweet from this sample for the random sample of 500. It was observed that
approximately 10% of Twitter accounts and comments had been deleted or suspended.
These and any unrelated comments were excluded and randomly replaced from the
Sysomos sample of 3,000. The researcher discovered that excluding “RT” for retweets in
Russia also excluded original tweets from Russia Today, now known as RT. Thus, the
sample for Russia was downloaded into Excel in its entirety, and the random sample
excluded retweets by hand. A handful of extra comments were coded from each country,
in the event that more were eliminated as unrelated or the researcher was unable to find
their links. Thus, some nations have a few more than 1,000 and the grand total of this
study is 6,019. The sample was a very small proportion of actual Twitter comments, and
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also not reflective of the preponderance of Twitter comments about Trump, which were
roughly double the frequency of Clinton comments. But this does not detract from the
goal of this study, to identify the sources who set the media agenda, and to provide the
foundation for future research into the effects and behaviors caused by repeated exposure
and media frames.
The sample size of 6,019 was large enough to perform content analysis on the
overall components of frequent Twitter comments in this period. Xiang (2013) had
performed content analysis on 4,250 international social media comments about China.
Gurman and Ellenberger (2015) examined 2,616 tweets around the world for their study
about Haiti earthquake messages. Lee, Kim and Kim (2015) analyzed content in 494
tweets in their study of Korean journalists’ topics. Other recent studies, such as the
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Oxford Internet Institute study of Russian propaganda (Howard, 2017), examined
millions of tweets using automated coding systems, which was limited to those tweets
that contained selected hashtags, and sources were identified through their URL
addresses by the program Streaming API. The present study was not limited to hashtags,
and examined sources through their actual profile pages, providing greater detail, validity
and reliability about thousands of users in several countries.
The tweets for this study were downloaded from Sysomos into Excel. Coders
used the embedded link in one Excel column to copy and then “Paste and Go” directly to
the Twitter comment online, which showed the tweet as it originally appeared, including
attendant images, links, comments, number of retweets, and so forth. Coders clicked on
the user name to observe the profile page, the user’s other comments and number
offollowers, and email address or website. This information helped confirm an
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individual’s or a company’s identity and authenticity, which was most often clearly
evident.
Coding Variables and Analysis
Quantitative analysis allows for isolating variables and relating them to the
magnitude and frequency of relationships with highly reliable and valid measures. The
context variables were determined by the research questions; variables here include the
individual nations as well as the keywords “Trump” and “Clinton.” Substantive and
affective variables for coding were determined by previous content analyses and other
studies, which are described in the sections below. In addition, the researcher and a
second coder performed pilot coding and examined 500 Twitter comments representing
each country under study. The pilot coding helped make slight adjustments to the final
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coding instrument, as also noted below.
Individual Sources
Analyzing sources is key to this study, as this variable will determine who is
building the agenda on Twitter for this particular event. For an individual or solitary
source, this would mean a typical consumer or unaffiliated “citizen,” or a journalist (such
as Dan Rather), a politician (e.g., Senator Cory Booker, or Mayor Bill deBlasio), a
diplomat (such as an ambassador in Brazil), a government employee (someone who
identifies as working at the EPA, for example), or a nonpolitical celebrity (e.g., Beyonce,
or Stephen Colbert). These particular types of individual sources were identified in
previous social media studies about the role of audience members as content creators. For
example, Golan and Himelboim (2015) studied directional news flow and global network
analysis on Twitter and singled out sources who were unaffiliated individuals as opposed
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to media, governments or organizations. Hermida, Lewis & Zamith (2014) studied
Twitter comments of journalists during the Arab Spring of 2011, identifying them
through their profile pages. Lee, Kim and Kim (2015) performed content analysis of 52
Korean journalists’ tweets to determine whether they covered public affairs or more
personal topics. Shoemaker and Reese (1996) had discussed the importance of the
characteristics of individual journalists who build an agenda. The current study aimed to
narrow in on a variety of individual sources who set the Twitter agenda in the 2016
election, and coded separately for individual, journalist, politician, diplomat, government
employee, and non-political celebrity.
Group Sources
In addition to sources conceptualized as being an individual, as described above,
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there were separate variables to identify whether the Twitter source was a “group,” such
as a news media organization, (e.g., The New York Times or CBS News) as opposed to a
named individual journalist (which fell into the individuals category above). This type of
“group” source also included the Twitter profile of a non-news business, such as Wells
Fargo or McDonalds, of an institute or university such as Brookings or Harvard, an
activist or nonprofit organization (e.g., The Sierra Club or Planned Parenthood), or an
official government agency account such as the National Parks Service or the Department
of Homeland Security. Other content analysis studies have singled out such Twitter
sources that are groups. Golan and Himelboim’s (2015) study on news flow focused on
Twitter mediators that were news media outlets, governments and non-government
organizations such as Wikileaks. Howard’s study at the Oxford Internet Institute (2017)
singled out sources that were professional news outlets, amateur news outlets,
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government agencies, think tanks, universities, and political parties, among others. Kim,
Xiang and Kiousis (2011) and Kiousis, Kim, Ragas, Wheat, Kochhar, Svensson and
Miles (2015) performed agenda-building content analyses during election campaigns and
also focused on sources such as news media, policymakers, businesses, interest groups,
and political parties, among others. Lotan, Graeff, Ananny, Gaffney, Pearce and Boyd
(2011) studied what types of actors on Twitter started and propagated information flow
during Middle East uprisings, and classified “actors” into groups and individuals such as
news organizations, journalists, individuals, non-media organizations, celebrities,
politicians and activist groups. The categorizations in studies such as these informed the
selection of source types for this study.
In addition, the coders counted the numbers of “likes” and “retweets” for each
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Twitter comment, as previously done in public diplomacy studies by Park and Lim
(2014) and Lotan et al., (2011) study of information flow. This served to further
characterize the reach and influence of the varied sources.
Dominant Topics
Previous studies in agenda-building of political campaigns have analyzed media
content for various topics. For example, Kiousis, Kim, McDevitt and Ostowski (2009)
studied election campaign topics in U.S. mainstream media that included education,
terrorism, international problems, social issues, immigration and war. Sheafer and
Wiemann (2005) studied agenda-building in Israel by examining whether media content
focused on domestic policy or international security. Gruzczynski and Wagner (2016)
selected topics for their “agenda uptake” study of 2008 election issues in the media by
examining people’s Google search terms on Google Trends, which they cross-referenced
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with the internet data-mining tool called Meme Tracker. They selected topics that
appeared in Meme Tracker, including abortion, economy, Iraq, and--in order to measure
uptake of issues that were considered scandalous--“lipstick on a pig,” an epithet used by
Barack Obama to describe his opponent’s economic plan, one that was quickly adopted
by the GOP and used against him. Lotan et al. (2011) used the Twitter application
programming interface (API) to search select keywords. Golan and Viatchaninova (2014)
examined Russia’s use of paid advertorials in India and the U.S., including variables of
interest such as international politics, domestic issues, human rights, science, and human
interest stories, among many others. Lasorsa, Lewis and Holton (2012) performed content
analysis on journalists’ tweets and coded for topics such as business, politics, and
entertainment or celebrities.
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Variables for this study came from studies such as these, and were selected here
to include the campaign itself or the “horserace,” including polls or campaign rallies,
social issues (such as religion and gender rights), international relations/immigration/war,
American topics such as the economy, constitutional rights and income taxes; and
personal attacks, meaning that the candidate was presented as incompetent, untrustworthy
or criminal. As this study examined the perspectives of international social media, the
topic list was extended to include the effect on the host nation of the Twitter source (e.g.,
“is this American candidate good for India?”). Given that Twitter is a limited space for
posting messages with only 140 characters, the topics were relatively clear and simple to
code.
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Secondary Topics
Additional topics emerged from pilot coding of a sample of 500 tweets, as well as
from the data collection engine Sysomos Media Analysis, which was prompted for
“Topic Insights” and identified popular keywords in these Twitter samples, such as
“Wikileaks” and “Comey,” which were added to the coding sheet. Prior studies used
similar results from analytical tools Google Trends and Meme Tracker (Gruzcynski &
Wagner, 2016). Secondary topics for this study thus included “email server,”
“FBI/Comey,” “computer hacking,” “sexual assault,” “Wikileaks/Assange,” and “tax
return.” In most instances—more than 80% of the 6019 comments--there were no
mentions of these secondary topics at all, and those tweets were coded as zero. As this
subcategory seemed relatively negligible, the data were collected but not analyzed in this
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study.
Images
Similar to the secondary topics, many tweets did not contain any image at all, and
thus, this variable most often was coded as zero. However, when the tweet contained an
image, the coders marked its existence by coding it as an image of Trump (1) or Clinton
(2), both candidates (3) or another subject completely (4). This data might inform
research on cultural aspects of Twitter. For example, Park and Lim (2014) studied public
diplomacy on social media in Asia and found that Twitter users in Japan used more
images than text. Some visual communications studies examined content of images on
Twitter, such as Seo’s (2014) study propaganda in Twitter images during the 2012 Hamas
conflict in Israel. Fahmy, Bock and Wanta (2014) briefly discussed the relatively new
phenomenon of images on Twitter created by citizens in their overview of visual
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communication theory. Other studies about Twitter that examined news flow or content
did not consider images at all, such as Lotan et al. (2011), Golan and Himelboim (2016)
and Gurman and Ellenberger (2015). While visuals are not the primary focus of the
present study, the researcher wanted to measure their frequencies and explore their
presence and variations between candidates and among various cultures. .
Comment Tone
Agenda-building suggests that sources “may not just influence what topics are
covered in media coverage, but also how those topics are portrayed and ultimately how
they are defined in public opinion” (Kiousis et al., 2006, p. 270). This includes whether
the message is positive in tone, or negative, or neutral. Message valence and overall tones
of news stories and social media posts e have been studied in a variety of media and
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themes. Many of these studies focus on topics such as negative media frames of China in
global media (Ono & Jiao, 2008; Lams, 2015). Those which focused on election
campaigns include McCombs, Llamas, Escobar-Lopez and Rey (2000), who studied a
Spanish general election and measured whether media included affective attributes that
were positive, such as “a good leader,” and those that were neutral or negative. Golan and
Wanta (2001) studied the 2000 Republican primary in New Hampshire and found that
candidate John McCain was covered in media with more positive tones than was George
W. Bush. Researchers Kiousis, Kim, Ragas, Wheat, Kochhar, Svensson and Miles (2015)
examined negative, neutral and positive tones in media frames of candidates in the 2012
U.S. presidential election, and found that these tones were linked to those in the
information subsidies provided to media. Yoon and Lee (2013) examined media tones
about Clinton’s 2008 primary race against Obama, and found they were more negative
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for Clinton. For the present study, coders considered the valence of each Twitter
comment. For example, calling someone a “crook” or “incompetent” was coded as
negative in tone, whereas someone who is the “best person for the job” was coded
positive in tone. Calling someone merely a “Republican” or a “liberal” was considered
neutral in tone. A rally with a celebrity was considered a positive comment for the
“campaign/horserace” of either candidate. Positive or negative poll numbers and
endorsements were also coded, accordingly, as positive or negative tones for a candidate.
Pilot coding revealed an initial intercoder reliability of 0.74 for Tones. Therefore,
the coders convened to review and discuss these results, and learned that discrepancies in
Tone largely were caused by interpreting Twitter messages about FBI investigations. The
coders resolved the discrepancies by determining that a comment that simply reported the
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FBI investigation of Clinton emails was to be coded as neutral. But if the comment
suggested that Clinton’s campaign was “in trouble” due to the investigation, or the word
“criminal” appeared, that Twitter message was coded as negative for her. When the
coders recoded the pilot sample in this way, the intercoder reliability for Tone improved
to 0.79. Coders agreed not to seek out any hidden meanings in Twitter comments other
than what was expressly stated.
In order to focus and analyze those who were setting the agenda and choosing the
topics, this study examined only original tweets, not the comments or replies, nor those
that were retweets (shared from elsewhere). Previous studies have examined the
frequencies of retweets, such as Lasorsa et al. (2012), who found that 15% of journalists’
Twitter posts were retweets from other commenters. Gurman and Ellenberger (2015)
studied 2,635 tweets during the 2010 Haiti earthquake relief effort and found that 13% of
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them were retweets. The present study aimed to explore the origins of topics on the media
agenda, and the researcher opted to exclude the comments that were not original. The
comments in this study did include those that contained hyperlinks, links to other news
stories or websites, but not the retweets that originated from another Twitter commenter.
Lewis et al. (2013) noted that the brevity of Twitter messages may require extra
examination to discern meaning, as traditional media texts (i.e., print and broadcast
transcripts) are lengthier and more explicit. They point out that coders must consider
context and understand “the rhythms of Twitter or the culture around a particular
hashtag” (p. 48) in order to code them most effectively. Hermida (2010) noted that
Twitter streams are fragmented and multi-faceted and that the significance of a single
message has less validity than the aggregate effect of many messages. Therefore, the
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context of messages and size of this study’s sample are limitations. In addition, the ability
for a Twitter user to create his or her own profile means that the sources are self-defined,
and these may not clearly be classified as journalist, politician, publicist, everyday
citizen, and so forth. Many “influential Twitter users do not easily fit into traditional
categorization schemes” (Lotan et al., 2011, p. 1397). In spite of these limitations, the
data are voluminous and randomized, assuring informative results.
As previously described, the researcher and a second coder reviewed a pilot
sample of 500 Twitter comments, and refined certain variables and definitions. After
these modest revisions, a coding sheet was finalized, as shown in Appendix A.
Reliability
After training and the pilot tests, the coders moved on to testing for intercoder
reliability. They coded the topics, sources, retweets, images and tones of a random
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subsample of 900 Twitter comments (15% of the total) The researcher measured
intercoder reliability using Krippendorff’s alpha, and the rates of agreement achieved by
the two coders for key variables were: Nation, 1.0; Date, 1.0; Number of Retweets, 1.0;
Number of “Likes,” 0.99; Presence of embedded link, 0.92; Source Type, 0.92; Topic,
0.89; Secondary Topic, 0.90, Image Subject, 0.89, and Comment Tone, 0.79.
As discussed, the intercoder reliability for Tone of Twitter comment was
marginally less than 0.80, which is not an optimal score for reliability. However,
Krippendorff (1980) himself reported studies with alphas below .80, and other
researchers (Wimmer & Dominick, 2003; Bannerjee, Capozzoli, McSweeney & Sinha,
1999) proposed a standard minimum alpha of .75, which has been the intercoder
reliability score for “tone” in other recent content analyses (e.g., Kiousis et al, 2015). As
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such, the score of .79 is acceptable here, particularly for this study which coded content
from a variety of different cultures.
The researcher used SPSS for chi-square analysis as well as ANOVA tests for
means distributions. The Results section below highlights select findings related
specifically to the research questions.
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CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

Sources of Twitter Comments
Research Question 1 examines the types of sources who commented on Twitter
about candidates Trump and Clinton. In every nation, the preponderance of sources
making comments were individuals, “everyday citizens” with no professional affiliation
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or public persona. Depending on the nation, between 56% and 80% of all Twitter
comments came from individuals, as shown in Table 4.1. As such, no statistical analyses
were run to determine whether there were significant differences between individuals and
other source types. The second most frequent commenters were either journalists or news
media companies. As indicated, the proportions of source types were largely equivalent
across nations.
Table 4.1 shows the frequencies of source types for all Twitter comments in the
sample, comprised from subtotals of roughly 500 comments for each candidate in each
nation. The first three columns—individual, journalist, politician/celebrity—are sources
who are individuals and not groups or associations. Coders found that there were very
few individual diplomats or government employees in the entire sample—in fact,
virtually none—so these were combined into the “other” category. There were also few

47

celebrities and politicians represented, but they are listed here for comparison purposes.
The second three columns in Table 4.1 represent “group” Twitter accounts, such as
official news media companies, other business that are not news-related, institutions and
nonprofit organizations. There were very few in the latter groups, but are also included in
the table for comparison purposes.
To provide additional information about the sources in each nation, and to
measure the potential impact of these sources in the Twitter universe, this study compiled
lists of the sources in this study who have the largest numbers of “followers.” Results
indicated that the most frequent Twitter commenters in each country are everyday
citizens, many of whom have only a few hundred followers. This list of impactful sources
includes individual sources such as celebrities and journalists, and mostly large news
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corporations and with global identities. Also included here are actual tweets from the data
under study, to provide examples of typical posts and the expanse of followers that were
exposed to them. Table 3 shows the most-followed Twitter sources from the 6019 tweets
in this study sample, organized by nation. Table 4.2 is followed by six figures that show
actual Twitter comments from the study sample, as well as observations about the Twitter
comments in each nation. Additional samples of the actual Twitter comments are
included in Appendix B.
As with most countries, the American sample of 1,000 contained Twitter posts
from major news outlets, and these were the Twitter accounts with the greatest numbers
of followers. In all of the nations’ samples, there was no other journalist who had nearly
as many followers as Vox.com editor-in-chief Ezra Klein. While popular celebrities such
as Ellen DeGeneres and Katy Perry may have many more Twitter followers (73 million
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and 104 million, respectively) among many others Americans, they were not among the
random sample in this study. Contrary to the findings of Benkler et al. (2017) and Faris et
al. (2017), this sample of 1,000 tweets from the U.S. did not contain any that originated
with Breitbart or InfoWars. Samples are shown in Figure 4.1.
United Kingdom
Two or three of the predominantly pro-Trump British tweets were from residual
“bots” whose accounts had not been deleted, such as a user named “Juliette Bot” showing
a photo of an attractive woman, who had more than 11,000 followers. The U.K. sample
also showed more than 60 comments from a group called “Israel Bombs Babies,” one of
many pseudonymous commenters who propagated negative comments claiming Clinton
was a pedophile and a Satanist. However, the Twitter users with the greatest numbers of
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followers were all news media companies. See samples in Figure 4.2.
Brazil
The sample of Twitter comments from Brazil contained a number of anomalies. First,
there was a total of 320,000 comments using the keyword “Trump” within the dates of
this study, but only about 11,000 for Clinton, as mentioned in the Methods section. This
difference in proportion was not so extreme in other nations. Also, the data sample from
Brazil contained almost no media companies or journalists at all, unlike most other
countries. Those that are included above, “Reuters” and” TypGyn” news, have relatively
modest numbers of followers, compared to news outlets in any other nation, which may
be due to their use of English language. Another unusual Twitter phenomenon in Brazil
were individuals casting pro-Clinton “votes” in an online poll that linked to the Twitter
page of a NBC TV affiliate in Connecticut. This same poll was posted more than 50
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times in Brazil on November 8 by different individuals (see sample in Figure 5), and was
not observed in any other nation. It appeared to be an automated post, the only one that
appeared to be in favor of Clinton, and these comprised roughly 10% of her entire (and
modest) Brazil sample. See two examples in Figure 4.3
Russia
Many Russia comments–more than 10% of them—had been deleted or the
account was “closed” after November 8. It was observed that many comments in Russia
contained links to Breitbart and InfoWars.com, more than in other countries, and more
frequently than links to other American media. It was also noted that the top sources here
in English language included an American journalism school in St. Petersburg, an
American columnist for the conservative newspaper Washington Times, a British
50
journalist, and an American PR executive (Benador) who was clearly working to promote
Trump. Benador’s comments always included hashtags such as #MAGA (“Make
American Great Again,” Trump’s campaign tagline) or #ONLY TRUMP. There were
very few media companies or Russian journalists in the sample, which may be due to the
limitation of English language, but may also reflect the efforts of agenda-building in the
language that easily transmits to the United States. See Figure 4.4.

50

Table 4.1
Frequency of Twitter comments, by Source Type.
Individual
US
-Trump
-Clinton

UK
-Trump
-Clinton

Brazil
-Trump
-Clinton
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Russia
-Trump
-Clinton

India
-Trump
-Clinton

China
-Trump
-Clinton

Totals
-Trump
-Clinton

Journalist

Pol/Celeb

News co

Oth bus.

Inst/Non

Othr

414
(82.8%)
372
(74.4%)

20
(4%)
26
(5.2%)

3
(0.6%)
0
(0%)

36
(7.2%)
56
(11.2%)

10
(2%)
16
(3.2%)

15
(3%)
25
(5%)

2
(0.4%)
5
(1%)

367
(73.4%)
346
(68.7%)

23
(4.6%)
17
(3.4%)

9
(1.8%)
5
(1%)

62
(12.4%)
75
(14.9%)

24
(4.8%)
43
(8.5%)

9
(1.8%)
17
(3.4%)

6
(1.2%)
1
(0.2%)

437
(86.7%)
433
(85.6%)

14
(2.8%)
22
(4.3%)

4
(0.8%)
7
(1.4%)

13
(2.6%)
30
(5.9%)

7
(1.4%)
2
(0.4%)

6
(1.2%)
11
(2.2%)

23
(4.6%
1
(0.2%)

366
(73.1%)
283
(56.5%)

53
(10.6%)
89
(17.8%)

0
(0%)
1
(0.2%)

35
(7%)
84
(16.8%)

34
(6.8%)
22
(4.4%)

11
(2.2%)
22
(4.4%)

2
(0.4%)
0
(0%)

326
(65.1%)
313
(62.5%)

26
(5.2%)
31
(6.2%)

84
(16.8%)
3
(0.6%)

101
(20.2%)
106
(21.2%)

30
(6%)
25
(5%)

5
(1%)
13
(2.6%)

4
(1%)
10
(2%)

367
(73.3%)
352
(70.4%)

56
(11.2%)
56
(11.2%)

3
(0.6%)
2
(0.4%)

44
(8.8%)
46
(9.2%)

19
(3.8%)
28
(5.6%)

3
(0.6%)
3
(0.6%)

9
(1.8%)
13
(2.6%)

2277
(75.7%)
2099
(69.7%)

192
(6.4%)
241
(8%)

27
(0.9%)
17
(0.6%)

291
(9.7%)
397
(13.2%)

124
(4.1%)
136
(4.5%)

49
(1.6%)
91
(3%)

47
(1.5%)
30
1%
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United States
Table 4.2
Twitter Sources in this Study Sample that Have the Most Followers
Nation
Twitter Source
No. of Twitter Followers
U.S.

The Washington Post
Entertainment Weekly
NBC News
Bloomberg Media
USA Today
The Hill
Fortune magazine
Ezra Klein, Vox Media journalist

10,509,000
6,483,825
4,807,000
4,050,600
3,358,600
2,540,000
2,227,200
1,796,007

U.K.

BBC Breaking News
The Economist
BBC World News
The Guardian
Sky News TV
Financial Times
The Independent
The Telegraph

32,357,000
20,706,000
19,720,000
6,582,000
4,100,000
2,870,000
2,262,000
2,150,000

Brazil

Tony Rocha, unverified “radio and TV director”
Ricardo Nester, self-described actor and journalist
Reuters Brasil
Yasmin Mitri, unverified actress
Ed Perez, individual
TopGyn News
Carlos Bolsonaro, conservative politician

2,103,000
966,000
298,000
136,000
127,000
109,000
116,000

Russia

RT, formerly Russia Today
Sputnik News
Poynter Journalism School, St. Petersburg
Alexander Nekrassov, unaffiliated journalist
L. Todd Wood, Washington Times correspondent
Shaun Walker, Guardian correspondent
Eliana Benador, Individual, PR consultant

2,601,870
188,000
180,000
85,000
71,000
67,000
63,000

India

NDTV
Times Now TV
ABP News TV
The Hindustan Times
India Today TV
The Hindu
CNN News 18
Zee TV News
ANI (Asian News Intl)

9,940,000
7,820,000
6,980,000
5,700,000
4,380,000
4,350,000
3,670,000
3,520,000
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China

2,080,000

China Xinhua News
People’s Daily, China
CGTN China Global Television Network
China.org
Ryan Edward Chou, CGTV journalist,
Global Times

52

10,100,000
3,780,000
3,330,000
469,000
384,000
314,000
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Figure 4.1
Samples of Twitter Comments from Top U.S. Sources
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.
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Figure 4.2
Samples of Twitter Comments from Top UK.. Sources
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Figure 4.3
Samples of Twitter Comments from Top Brazil Sources
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Figure 4.4
Samples of Twitter Comments from Top Russia Sources
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Figure 4.5
Samples of Twitter Comments from Top India Sources
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India
India was notable because although the sources were mostly individuals, there
were many more news media companies on Twitter than there were in other nations.
More than 20% of Twitter comments about both candidates came from major television
or print news companies in India, whereas in most other countries these comprised 10%
or less. This may indicate that media companies in India are much more active on social
media than those in other countries, or, perhaps, individuals simply use Twitter less in
India. English is an official language in India, of course, and English language news is
already popular here, in print and television, so Twitter may be more of a natural
platform for India media than other international cultures. See Figure 4.5.
China
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In China, government control means that average citizens do not have internet
access to Twitter or Facebook. Chinese consumers use Weibo and WeChat instead.
Therefore, as expected, the Twitter sources in this study were largely media companies
and journalists; the individuals posting on Twitter here were primarily ex-patriate
Americans and British living in China. But the numbers of followers for these English
language state-controlled media companies are impressive, e.g., Xinhua News with 10
million Twitter followers around the world is equal in reach as The Washington Post is.
China sample tweets are shown in Figure 4.6.
Topics of Twitter Comments
Research Question 2 addressed the general topics featured in Twitter comments
about the two presidential candidates. As shown in Table 4.3, the most frequent topics of
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Twitter comments were somewhat divergent about Trump and Clinton. This is further
examined below.
As shown in Table 4.4, the most frequent topic in Twitter comments, in every
nation, was the campaign or “horserace.” This is particularly true for comments about
Trump, where nearly 70% focused on the race, somewhat consistently across nations,
whereas for Clinton the frequency of comments about the campaign was lower, about
49%, of the time, but it was still the most frequent topic. The second most frequent topic
was a personal attack on the candidate—but there were more than twice as many personal
attack comments on Clinton (1182) than there were about Trump (454). This is probably
due to the fact that so many comments talked about the renewed FBI investigation into
Clinton emails and how she remained under a cloud of suspected criminal activity. There
59
is a significant difference between Clinton and Trump in these Twitter topic categories, in
every country in this study, as shown in Table 4.4.
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Figure 4.6
Samples of Twitter Comments from Top China Sources
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Table 4.3
Main Topic in Twitter Comments
Campaign

US
-Trump
-Clinton

UK
-Trump
-Clinton

Brazil
-Trump
-Clinton
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Russia
-Trump
-Clinton

India
-Trump
-Clinton

China
-Trump
-Clinton

Totals
-Trump
-Clinton

Own
nation

Social
issue

Internat’l/
immigration

US
issue

Personal
Attack

Other

372
(74.4%)
190
(38%)

0
(0%)
0
(0%)

10
(2%)
2
(0.4%)

12
(2.4%)
5
(1%)

12
(2.4%)
7
(1.4%)

81
(16.2%)
285
(57%)

13
(2.6%)
11
(2.2%)

346
(69.2%)
256
(50.7%)

10
(2%)
6
(1.1%)

7
(1.4%)
6
(1.1%)

17
(3.4%)
22
(4.3%)

8
(1.6%)
2
(0.4%)

100
(20%)
189
(37.5%)

12
(2.4%)
23
(4.5%)

375
(74.4%)
257
(50.7%)

14
(2.8%)
2
(0.4%)

1
(0.2%)
5
(1%)

23
(4.6%)
11
(2.1%)

4
(0.8%)
5
(1%)

66
(13.1%)
198
(39.1%)

21
(4.1%)
28
(5.5%)

351
(70%)
217
(43.3%)

37
(7.4%)
29
(5.8%)

1
(0.2%)
1
(0.2%)

15
(3%)
15
(3%)

8
(1.6%)
3
(0.6%)

67
(13.3%)
217
(43.3%)

22
(4.4%)
19
(3.8%)

324
(64.6%)
280
(55.8%)

33
(6.6%)
43
(8.5%)

6
(1.2%)
3
(0.6%)

36
(7.2%)
6
(1.2%)

15
(3%)
12
(2.4%)

74
(14.8%)
133
(26.5%)

13
(2.6%)
24
(4.8%)

333
(66.4%)
270
(54%)

28
(5.6%)
22
(4.4%)

6
(1.2%)
1
(0.2%)

18
(3.6%)
19
(3.8%)

6
(1.2%)
3
(0.6%)

66
(13.2%)
160
(32%)

44
(8.8%)
25
(5%)

2101
(69.9%)
1470
(48.8%)

122
(4%)
102
(3.4%)

31
(1.1%)
18
(0.6%)

121
(4%)
78
(2.6%)

53
(1.8%)
32
(1.1%)

454
(15.1%)
1182
(39.2%)

125
(4.2%)
130
(4.3%)
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Table 4.4
Most Frequent Twitter Topics about Each Candidate

US
-Campaign
-Pers. attack
UK
-Campaign
-Pers. attack
Brazil
-Campaign

62

-Pers. attack
Russia
-Campaign
-Pers. attack
India
-Campaign
-Pers. attack
China
-Campaign
-Pers. attack
Totals
-Campaign
-Pers. attack

Clinton

Trump

2

df

Sig.

190 (38%)
285 (57.5%)

372 (74.4%)
81 (16.2%)

134.565
150.840

1
1

.000
.000

256 (50.7%)
189 (37.5%)

346 (69.2%)
100 (20%)

36.158
36.966

1
1

.000
.000

257 (50.7%)

375 (74.4%)

63.648

1

.000

198 (39.1%)

66 (13.1%)

100.218

1

.000

217 (43.3%)
217 (43.3%)

351 (70%)
67 (13.3%)

64.830
113.051

1
1

.000
.000

280 (55.8%)
133 (26.5%)

324 (64.6%)
74 (14.8%)

8.805
26.583

1
1

.003
.000

270 (54%)
160 (32%)

333 (66.4%)
66 (13.2%)

16.750
50.742

1
1

.000
.000

1470 (48.8%)
1182 (39.2%)

2101 (69.9%)
454 (15.1%)

25.112
22.820

5
5

.000
.000

Images in Twitter Comments

Research Question 2 addressed the content in the Twitter comments, and this
includes the frequency of images and their subjects. Results shown in Table 4.5 show that
most tweets (more than 68% of the total) did not contain any image at all. Of those that
did contain images, commenters were more likely to include an image when the comment
was about Clinton (32%) than if it was about Trump (24.8%). Comments about Trump
featured his image a total of 291 times, compared to Clinton comments showing her
image in 473 tweets.
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Table 4.5
Frequency of Image Subject in Twitter Comments
No image
US
-Trump
-Clinton
UK
-Trump
-Clinton
Brazil
-Trump
-Clinton
63

Russia
-Trump
-Clinton
India
-Trump
-Clinton
China
-Trump
-Clinton
Totals
-Trump
-Clinton

Trump

Clinton

Both

Other

415
(83%)
377
(75.4%)

35
(7%)
5
(1%)

6
(1.1%)
82
(16.4%)

5
(1%)
9
(1.8%)

39
(7.8%)
27
(5.4%)

338
(67.6%)
337
(66.8%)

57
(11.4%)
11
(2.1%)

5
(1%)
75
(14.9%)

16
(3.2%)
31
(2%)

54
(10.8%)
50
(10%)

365
(72.4%)
302
(59.6%)

44
(8.7%)
10
(2%)

10
(2%)
70
(13.8%)

23
(4.5%)
67
(13.2%)

62
(12.3%)
57
(11.2%)

348
(69.4%)
350
(69.8%)

58
(11.6%)
14
(2.8%)

17
(3.3%)
91
(18.8%)

19
(3.7%)
8
(1.5%)

59
(11.7%)
38
(7.5%)

338
(67.5%)
322
(64.2%)

67
(13.3%)
14
(2.8%)

13
(2.6%)
78
(15.5%)

37
(7.4%)
39
(7.7%)

46
(9.2%)
48
(9.6%)

428
(85.4%)
428
(85.4%)

30
(6%)
7
(1.4%)

6
(1.2%)
77
(15.4%)

10
(2%)
31
(6.2%)

27
(5.4%)
25
(5%)

2262
(75.2%)
2048
(68%)

291
(9.7%)
61
(2%)

57
(1.9%)
473
(15.7%)

110
(3.6%)
185
(6.1%)

287
(9.5%)
245
(8.1%)
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Images were used most frequently in Brazil, the U.K. and in India, but only
marginally moreso than in other countries. The researcher considered various factors in
the use of images, and transformed the data to see whether use of images corresponded to
whether a country was considered a high-context or low-context culture (Hall, 1976;
Hofstede, 1993), and found there was no correlation. Next, the researcher examined
whether use of images corresponded to whether the nation was a democracy or a statecontrolled regime, which also proved not significant. While the results of Tone analysis is
reported in detail later in this section , the researcher did find a relationship between Tone
of content and the use of images. If the comment had an image and was negative in tone,
it was most likely to contain an image of Clinton. Trump’s face appeared mostly
frequently in positive comments (146); Clinton’s image appeared mostly in negative
64
comments (262), all of which were most frequently posted by Russian Twitter users.
These numbers are not large, but provide an important foundation to additional studies
about images in political communication and social media. Overall comment tones are
discussed in greater detail in their own section on page 75.
Table 4.6
Tone and Presence of Image in Twitter Comment
Trump Image
Russia India China 2
12
35
7
24
14
7
32
23
72
81
37
41.452

Negative
Neutral
Positive 18
Total

US
21
1
25
40

UK
26
17
12
68

Brazil
28
14
36
54

Negative
Neutral
Positive 25
Total

US
49
14
23
88

UK
44
13
24
80

Clinton Image
Brazil Russia India
36
68
32
20
9
21
31
38
37
80
108
91
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China
33
13
83

2

27.907

df

Sig.

10

.000

df

Sig.

10

.002

Means testing was performed to confirm these findings, entering the code 1 for
positive tone, 2 for neutral or balanced, and 3 for positive tones. Table 4.7 shows that
there were significant differences between the means for Trump (2.08) and Clinton (1.83)
regarding tone of Twitter comments that contained images.

Table 4.7
Means and ANOVA tests for Tones and Images
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Image:
None
Trump
Clinton
Both
Other
Total

N
4310
352
530
295
532
6019

Mean
Tone
1.94
2.05
1.84
2.26
1.93
1.95

Std
Dev.
.858
.884
.898
.752
.860
.862

F

Sig.

12.846

.000

Following are specific Twitter comments that were the most retweeted in this
sample. As indicated below, the comment retweeted most widely was in India, where a
news article about Clinton linking to Wikileaks was retweeted more than 4,100 times.
The second most widely-circulated tweet in this entire study was from the U.K., where a
conservative commentator who is associated with Alex Jones’ InfoWars remarked about
the FBI probe of Clinton and generated almost 3,000 retweets.
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Table 4.8

Comments and Sources with the Most Retweets
Nation
US

# of Retweets
2,598 on 11-5-16
1,557 on 11-7-16
879 on 10-30-16
559 on 10-31-16
521 on 11-5-16

UK

2,982 on 10-30-16
1,307 on 11-8-16
865 on 10-31-16
627 on 10-31-16

Brazil
66

26 on 11-8-16
12 on 10-31-16

Source
# of Followers
Fox News host DA Jeanine Pirro
675,000
McKay Coppins,
The Atlantic journalist
107,000
Joe Scarborough MSNBC
1,630,000
Fox & Friends
931,331
Daniel Dale, Toronto Star journalist 180,000
Paul Joseph Watson, conservative UK radio
host and Infowars editor-at-large 665,000
BBC Breaking News
32,357,000
Paul Joseph Watson, journalist
665,000
BBC Breaking News
32,357,000

Pedro Rafhael, Individual
Carlos Bolsonaro,
conservative politician

17,900
116,000

Russia

2,009 on 11-4-16
1,597 on 11-4-16
1,013 on 11-4-16
742 on 11-4-16
712 on 11-4-16
408 on 11-4-16

RT
RT
RT
RT
RT
RT

2,601,870
2,601,870
2,601,870
2,601,870
2,601,870
2,601,870

India

4,143 on 11-4-16
154 on 11-7-16
135 on 11-8-16
61 on 11-8-16
47 on 11-8-16

The Hindustan Times
Minhaz Merchant, journalist
Zero Hedge, financial news blog
Sahil Kapur, journalist
RJ Alok, journalist

5,700,000
135,000
427,000
70,000
417,000

China

228 on 11-5-16
179 on 11-7-16
136 on 11-3-16
99 on 11-5-16
98 on 11-6-16
81 on 11-4-16

CGTN
3,300,000
CGTN
3,300,000
Kaiser Kuo, journalist
46,500
Xinhua News
10,100,000
Xinhua News
10,100,000
Clay Shirky, American researcher
365,000
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Figure 4.7
Most Retweeted Twitter Comments in U.S.
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Figure 4.8
Most Retweeted Twitter Comments in U.K.

68

69

Figure 4.9
Most Retweeted Twitter Comments in Brazil
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Figure 4.10
Most Retweeted Twitter Comments in Russia
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Figure 4.11
Most Retweeted Twitter Comments in India
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Figure 4.12
Most Retweeted Twitter Comments in China
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Tones of Twitter Comments
Research Question 2 includes the examination of tones of Twitter comments—
what are the frequencies of those that are either negative, positive or neutral about
candidates Trump and Clinton, in the six nations. Table 4.9 shows the results, including
chi-squares and significance levels of the differences in tones between Trump and
Clinton.
In the U.S. and in Russia, the tones were significantly more positive for Trump
(46% and 56%) and significantly more negative for Clinton (60% and 60%). These posts
were not from “bots” but real individuals and organizations. The tones in these two
nations stand apart from the other four nations in the study. Only the United Kingdom
73

was most frequently negative about Trump on Twitter, about as equally as it was negative
about Clinton (41% and 42%).
In the U.K. and in Brazil, the tones on Twitter were largely negative about both
candidates. In India and China, tones were marginally more positive about each
candidate.
Means testing was performed to confirm these findings, using the code 1 for
positive tone, 2 for neutral or balanced, and 3 for positive tones. Tables 4.10 and 4.11
show that there were significant differences between the means for Trump (2.08) and
Clinton (1.83) regarding tone of Twitter comments.
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Table 4.
Tones of All Twitter Comments and significance of differences between Candidates
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Trump
_________
___________Clinton
___
2
df
p-value
Nation

74

74
74

Negative

Neutral

Positive

Negative

Neutral

Positive

U.S.
**206 (41%) ** 65 (13%) **229 (46%) **301 (60%) ** 86 (17%) **113 (23%)
60.066
2
.000
expected count 253.5
25.5
171
253.5
75.5
171
U.K.
**207 (41%) **123 (25%) **170 (34%) **210 (42%) **181 (36%) **113 (22%)
22.552
2
.000
expected count 207.7
151.4
170
209.3
152.6
142.1
Brazil
202 (40%)
114 (23%)
188 (37%)
198 (39%)
132 (26%) 176 (35%)
1.749
2
.417
expected count 199.6
122.8
181.6
200.4
123.2
182.4
Russia
** 95 (19%) ** 125 (25%) **281 (56%) **300 (60%) **115 (23%) ** 86 (17%)
210.419
2
.000
expected count 197.5
120
183.5
197.5
120
183.5
India
* 156 (31%) * 132 (26%) * 213 (43%) * 160 (32%) * 170 (34%) * 171 (34%) 9.426
2
.009
expected count 158
151
192
158
151
192
China
167 (33%)
151 (30%)
183 (37%)
177 (35%)
143 (29%) 180 (36%)
.532
2
.766
expected count 172.2
147.1
181.7
171.8
146.9
181.3
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
**p ≤ .000
*p ≤ .01
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Table 4.10
Means and ANOVA tests for Tones, in Total
N

Mean Std
Std Interval
Dev. Err. Bounds
F
Sig.
____________________________________________________
Trump
Clinton
Total

3007
3012
6019

2.08
1.83
1.95

.871
.835
.862

.016
.015
.011

2.05-2.11
1.80-1.86
1.93-1.98

124.260

.000

Mean Std
Dev.

Std
Err.

Interval
Bounds

F

Sig.

500
500
1000

2.05
1.62
1.84

.933
.829
.907

.042
.037
.029

1.96-2.13
1.55-1.70
1.78-1.89

57.165

.000

500
504
1004

1.93
1.81
1.87

.866
.778
.825

.016
.015
.011

1.85-2.00
1.74-1.88
1.82-1.92

5.201

.023

504
506
1010

1.97
1.96
1.96

.880
.869
.784

.039
.038
.027

1.90-2.05
1.88-2.03
1.91-2.02

.082

.774

501
501
1002

2.37
1.57
1.97

.784
.768
.872

.035
.034
.028

2.30-2.44
1.51-1.64
1.92-2.03

265.454

.000

501
501
1002

2.11
2.02
2.07

.851
.813
.833

.038
.036
.026

2.04-2.19
1.95-2.09
2.02-2.12

3.046

.081

501
500
1001

2.03
2.01
2.02

.836
.846
.841

.037
.038
.027

1.96-2.11
1.93-2.08
1.97-2.07

.238

.626

Table 4.11
Means Tests for Tone in each Nation
N
75

US
Trump
Clinton
Total
UK
Trump
Clinton
Total
Brazil
Trump
Clinton
Total
Russia
Trump
Clinton
Total
India
Trump
Clinton
Total
China
Trump
Clinton
Total
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Sources and Tone in the U.S. and Russia
Agenda-building studies traditionally involve the roles of journalists and news
outlets. Although individuals were the source for the largest numbers of Twitter
comments and tones about these candidates in every country, this study aimed to explore
the tones propagated by professional news sources in the U.S. and Russia, where 60% of
the comments were negative about Clinton and 56% were positive about Trump, as
shown in Table 4.12. These proportions were significantly more diverse than they were
in other nations. There have been revelations about the influence of Russian hackers on
Twitter, but this study examined whether the partisan phenomenon also occurred in
Twitter comments of official media professionals.
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Table 4.12
Tones of Journalists’ and News Outlets’ Twitter Comments

Nation

Trump
_____________
Negative Neutral
Positive

_Clinton
Negative

Neutral

______
Positive

U.S.
-journalist
4 (20%) 7 (35%)
-news comp 15 (42%) 10 (28%)

9 (45%)
11 (30%)

12 (46%)
23 (41%)

4 (15%) 26 (39%)
16 (29%) 17 (30%)

Russia
-journalist
9 (17%) 3 (6%)
-news comp 9 (26%) 12 (34%)

41 (77%)
14 (40%)

56 (66%)
45 (53%)

17 (19%) 16 (18%)
28 (34%) 11 (13%)

Table 4.12 shows that the journalists and media in the U.S. were more balanced in
tones on Twitter than the American public at large, but still most frequently negative
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about Clinton. This is surprising as almost every American mainstream news outlet
consistently reported Clinton as handily leading in the polls up until election day (e.g.,
“One last look at the polls: Hillary Clinton's lead is holding steady,” Los Angeles Times,
November 9; “Clinton leads by five points nationally as Trump personality concerns
persist,” Washington Post, November 6). The American journalist and media tones on
Twitter reveal that they were largely negative in tone, but not as significantly negative as
the public-at-large on Twitter. The one notable exception in Table 4.12 is that U.S. news
outlets (but not journalists) on Twitter were largely negative about Trump (as negative as
they were about Hillary). This is the only type of source in the U.S. that reflected
negative tones about Trump on Twitter comments.
In contrast, journalists and news media companies in Russia were more positive
about Trump (77%) and more frequently negative about Clinton (66%) than were all
77
individual citizens in Russia. These were not bots or trolls but professional news
producers, some of whom work for conservative American media outlets and some of
whom (e.g., RT) are official media outlets for the Russian government. In other words,
the pro-Trump and anti-Clinton tweets in Russia were not all hackers, but also news
media professionals.
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CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

Twitter and other social media have revived the need for agenda-building
research, as they have totally altered the landscape for traditional mainstream media as
well as for public diplomacy, information subsidies, policymakers and consumers.
Denham (2010) said that agenda-building is a constant negotiation between more and
78

more sources, and merits further study. Others have indicated that digital tools such as
Twitter need further study to advance knowledge of information subsidies (Waters,
Tindall & Morton, 2010) and as an agenda-building tool in elections (Kiousis et al., 2015;
Woolley, Limperos & Oliver, 2010). This research study was also motivated by the desire
to add to knowledge about the role of social media on the mainstream agenda, including
those messages generated across international borders, and the potential effects of social
media not only on elections but on democracy itself, in cultures around the world. In
addition, Guo and Vargo (2017) suggested “the investigation of intermedia agenda setting
between news media in different countries can greatly enrich our understanding of
international news flow and, ultimately, international relations” (p. 503). In this study of
6,019 Twitter comments about Trump and Clinton from six nations in the days prior to

78

the 2016 U.S. presidential election, a number of findings expand our knowledge about the
evolution of agenda-building.
Individuals Build the Agenda on Twitter
First, even aside from Russian infiltrators and Wikileaks tweets, and aside from
the candidates’ own tweets which received unprecedented attention from mainstream
media, Twitter was a source and a conduit that allowed regular citizens from around the
world to build the media agenda throughout the election campaign. Comments from
nonprofessional, everyday Twitter users vastly outnumbered those from journalists,
political parties, traditional public relations professionals and even the candidates
themselves. Previous studies (e.g. Lotan et al., 2011) had found that most Twitter users in
certain nations--roughly 70% of Twitter comments--came from individuals, and this
study found similar proportions for Twitter users not only in the U.S. and U.K. but in
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nations that had not yet been examined: in Brazil, Russia, India and China.
The Shorenstein study (Patterson, 2016) found that Trump’s media coverage was
77% negative, and that Clinton’s coverage was 63% negative. The present study found
that individuals on Twitter created a social media agenda that was at most 40% negative
for Trump, and 60% negative for Clinton. The results of the election suggest that Twitter
was a more accurate reflection of public opinion than other media, even excluding posts
from those who were not legitimate users. This study revealed specific details about the
phenomenon that has dominated mainstream news headlines (Calabresi, 2017; Dwoskin
et al., 2017), those that declared Russia had influenced the 2016 American presidential
election, and that they used Twitter to do it. The data in this study confirmed a pattern of
influence from Russia on Twitter, and also identified sources that were not merely “bots”
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but actual people. Legitimate citizen sources on Twitter in the U.S. and other nations—
not just Kremlin-backed hackers and news professionals—propagated certain tones and
story topics, and they drove the social media agenda during the pre-election period.
The MIT post-election study (Chou, 2016) identified the most common topics
among Clinton and Trump Twitter followers were gun rights, racial issues and
immigration. These topics were virtually nonexistent in the Twitter sample for the present
study. The agenda set by individuals in the present study focused on the campaign status
and personal attacks, in all six nations. The conversations were never about policies or
issues, not even about topics of international interest. This suggests that the current
sample did not include many who were Twitter followers of Clinton or Trump, such as
were studied at MIT, and that most Twitter commenters do not directly follow tweets
from the two candidates.
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Fisher and Brockerhoff (2008) and Golan and Himelboim (2016) found that
global social networking platforms such as Twitter provide countless opportunities for
direct interactions between governments and the foreign public. Results of this study
showed that governments per se were not a part of the conversations about the American
presidential election at all—except those from Russia that covertly infiltrated Twitter not
only as bots but as legitimate Russian individuals and government-sponsored media. It
was clearly an example of government interaction with the foreign public, in ways never
observed before, and it seems to have been easily implemented.
Russians Drove the American Media Agenda
Russian comments in this study came mostly from established accounts of real
individual people, although U.S. federal authorities are “examining the role companies
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like Facebook and Twitter had in swaying the 2016 election, and how they may have
been weaponized” with fake accounts and bots (Kosoff, 2017). Recent investigations
reveal that Twitter (and Facebook) were heavily populated by Russian-supported trolls
who championed Trump and denigrated Clinton, hundreds and thousands of times a day
(Shane, 2017). While this study lays out specific evidence that confirms this occurred, it
also provides specific examples of the equally negative tones of legitimate sources,
including media outlets. In other words, even excluding the Russian bots and trolls, the
tones were overwhelmingly in favor of Trump and against Clinton, in proportions unlike
any other nation.
The comment tones in the U.S. as well as in Russia were equally negative about
Clinton (60% negative in both the U.S. and Russia), much more than in other countries.
And only the Twitter users in the U.S. and Russia were predominantly positive about
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Trump. American comments were eerily similar to those in Russia, and further evidence
that Russians used American pseudonyms and internet addresses, and incited or amplified
American Twitter users to be wholeheartedly pro-Trump. One social media profile from a
Russian troll showed an American name with a background that could not be verified
later by investigative reporters, and whose photo showed him in a Brazilian restaurant,
and another photo revealing a “Brazilian-style electrical outlet” (Shane, 2017, p. A1).
Clearly, the Russian propaganda machine used internet protocol addresses in the Russia,
the U.S. and, as this study reflects, they probably used Brazilian internet protocol
addresses as well.
The Twitter sources in Brazil were unique compared to others countries—almost
entirely comprised of individuals (roughly 85%), more than any other nation. Brazilian
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media and journalists were virtually absent from Twitter, which was very unusual. Those
with the most followers were unverified “actresses” and “television producers.” Brazil
also had the greatest disparity of total comments about Trump during this period
(324,600) compared to those about Clinton (11,400). Although all the individuals in the
sample appeared to be legitimate people, such a discrepancy reflects an unnatural or
artificial presence in the Twitter parameter of Brazil. These legitimate accounts were very
likely trolls for Trump and may, in fact, reflect Russian operatives at work, as suggested
by Shane (2017). While some Trump trolls appeared in other nations as well, they were
far more numerous in Brazil, creating an unusual forum for international Twitter
discourse about the American candidates. Most news accounts about the Russian
influence on the campaign do not mention Brazil, but this study suggests there was some
sort of manipulation of Twitter accounts using internet addresses from several nations
82
around the world.
The changing and evasive nature of verifiable sources on social media—
pseudonyms and trolls--means that their role as “information subsidies” is insidiously
influential, and may lead to a general distrust of all media. And platforms such as Twitter
provide a direct and global platform that bypasses the usual scrutiny of news editors and
reporters. This platform clearly bypasses the usual scrutiny of international diplomats and
state departments as well. It is now known to be easily infiltrated and manipulated by
unknown and untraceable groups and individuals, as shown in this study.
Of course, the skepticism about verifiable news stories is also generated by those
in power who trade in falsehoods, with or without social media. Politicians and their
spokespeople were given wide berth by all the media to stretch the truth throughout the
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2016 election. For example, The New York Times has been widely rebuked by other
media companies for “very badly” erring in its over-coverage of the Clinton email issue
(Fallows, 2017, n.p.), which legitimized the topic for all other media. It inspired a postelection meme: “but her emails!” While the Times has yet to account for this biased
coverage of Clinton, this study opens up the possibility that the New York Times’
reporters—and other journalists--were scrolling through Twitter feeds and reading the
scores of RT posts, every time Wikileaks released another batch of old emails leaked
from the Clinton campaign. Vargo and Guo (2016) recently performed a large-scale
intermedia agenda-setting analysis for one year, and found that The New York Times and
other American mainstream media were likely to follow the agenda of online partisan
media agenda, rather than set the agenda themselves. Vargo and Guo (2016) found that
“partisan media were successful in predicting which issues were covered by other media”
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(p. 18). While the New York newspaper was not one of the mainstream outlets in this
particular study, this intermedia phenomenon does not explain why U.S. mainstream
media in this study were more critical about Trump than media in other nations. As a
group, the American media outlets on Twitter were equally negative about Trump and
Clinton, which is not in parallel with partisan media, nor with Russian media. American
media might have tipped the Twitter tones more in favor of Clinton, had Twitter not been
overwhelmed by Russian trolls. But the presence of American media tones on Twitter
were not reflective of the Twitter population as a whole, as they were in Russia.
In Russia, an exceptional 35 percent of Twitter comments about Clinton came
from journalists or media companies–a much higher proportion than did such Russian
comments about Trump, and greater than the other nations’ proportions of media and
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journalist comments. This provides residual evidence that thousands of individual
accounts and tweets were deleted, leaving behind an unusually high proportion of tweets
from news media and journalists. The most retweets in Russia were from RT, formerly
called Russia Today, the official government-run TV news media outlet. No other nation
had a single source representing all of the most popular retweets; in this case, the RT
tweets all centered on the same topic (the RT Julian Assange interview about Clinton
emails released through Wikileaks) and all on the same day (November 4). RT essentially
repeatedly tweeted a story that, taken together, was retweeted 6,481 times in a single day,
far more than any retweet in any nation during this period. Further examination might
reveal exactly who retweeted the RT Assange story 6,481 times; they were not all in
Russia, as that number far exceeds the total number of tweets in Russia that day (roughly
3,000). It is possible that more than one such retweeter was working at the The New York
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Times, which covered the Assange email story so thoroughly.
In the U.S., the Twitter sources with the most followers were media companies,
such as The Washington Post and NBC News (the New York Times did not appear in this
study’s random sample). However, those that were retweeted most frequently were often
specific journalists—such as Fox News’ Jeanine Pirro and MSNBC’s Joe Scarborough.
The American sample under study had no tweets directly from Breitbart or InfoWars,
although eight U.S. individuals tweeted links to those sites. Benkler et al. had found that
Breitbart was the “center of a distinct right-wing media ecosystem” (2017, n.p.) in their
automated study of Twitter during the six months prior to the election. Their study
indicated that Breitbart was most frequently retweeted by others, particularly by
individuals, but the present study found that Breitbart was not a frequent originator of
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tweets. It was observed that scores of individuals in the U.S. had screen names such as
“Sophia4Trump,” “TrumpGo2016,” “ExposeLiberals,” and variations using the word
“Deplorable.” This indicates that many U.S. Twitter comments about both Trump and
Clinton came from ardent Trump supporters, if not from Breitbart or Kremlin-backed
trolls. There were no such pseudonyms that seemed to specifically identify pro-Clinton
supporters.
Sources in the U.K. were comprised in similar proportions as the U.S.: news
media companies had the most followers, such as BBC Breaking News with more than 32
million followers (the most followers for a single source in this study). But the greatest
number of retweets were given to comments from specific journalists, particularly for the
InfoWars contributor and British conservative radio host, Paul Joseph Watson, which
contained inflammatory negative comments about Clinton.
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A similar pattern emerged for Twitter sources in India: individuals made the most
frequent comments but media companies dominated in numbers of followers, such as
NDTV and Times Now. The Hindustan Times ran the single most retweeted comment in
this entire study (4,143 retweets): the story about Wikileaks that seemed to originate at
RT in Russia, one which was retweeted by other major media around the world. In
China, there were mostly individuals represented as well, almost all of whom appeared to
be resident non-Asians who had access to Twitter. One of these individuals, to the
researcher’s surprise, was the communications scholar Clay Shirky, who appears to live
in Shanghai. A couple of other Chinese journalists, such as Kaiser Kuo, evidently work
for western news agencies or access Twitter through a non-Chinese internet server. The
most-followed and most-retweeted sources in China were media conglomerates, such as
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Xinhua News and CGTN. These media companies have millions of Twitter followers,
none of whom are Chinese citizens. The Twitter accounts of these English-language
media companies appear to serve one purpose only, and that is to disseminate statesanctioned news to users in other nations, not their own.
With the introduction of social media, Vargo and Guo (2016) found that even elite
American newspapers like The New York Times and Washington Post were no longer in
control of the news agenda, instead following the leads of online partisan media.
Research such as this study confirms this and widens our knowledge further, not only
about content created by journalists and news companies but by increasingly influential
masses of individual Twitter users, even those in foreign countries.
Conservative Journalists Helped Build the Twitter Agenda
It was surprising how minor a role journalists played overall in the Twitter
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discourse, as a source category, particularly in the U.S., where the role of journalism and
potential media bias was an issue Trump raised often during the campaign. The most
visible and voluble journalists were those that were very pro-Trump (e.g. Watson in the
U.K., Wood in Russia) and not in the United States.
Very few comments in this study—almost none--were contributed by politicians,
diplomats or other celebrities, and virtually none by organizations, associations,
educators or institutes. A handful of sources were private companies, some of which
included promotional comments. For example, betting companies were very popular in
the U.K., soliciting wagers from Twitter consumers for Trump or Clinton to win the
election. But for the most part, neither private nor public industry was a large part of the
Twittersphere in any country during this pre-election period.
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While many of the individuals had fewer than 5,000 followers, some of them, like
Eliana Benador in Russia, had as many as 63,000 followers, and she posted as much as
five or ten times a day, according to this random sample. Further investigation of
Benador’s website reveals she is a public relations professional consultant based in the
U.S. and was once employed by the administration of George W. Bush to promote the
2003 war in Iraq. The “weapons of mass destruction” in Iraq led the U.S. to war, also a
story that was completely misrepresented and globally legitimized by the New York
Times (Fallows, 2017). While that event was before the existence of Twitter, evidence of
this same provider of information subsidies in more than one misleading Times story is
indicative that Benador has influence with major media and conservative journalists, and
she now uses it effectively on social media. In this study, she proved to be an influential
and powerful presence shaping the social media agenda in Russia, and beyond, in favor
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of Trump. Benador continues to blog about conservative American causes. Her Twitter
account however, is registered with a server in Russia, indicating either the location of
her home or her primary client or business. In any event, her agenda was to promote
Trump heavily, revealing a link between the Trump campaign and information subsidies
from Russia that are not even secretive or pseudonymous. Benador is not a journalist per
se, and does not appear in any mainstream news stories about the election, but she clearly
affected the overall tones on Twitter in Russia, in partisan media, and consequently in
mainstream media as well.
Identifying the types of sources for social media confirms that individuals are
transforming into an enormous aggregate of information subsidies—and, sometimes,
propaganda—whether they are professionals or not. And while journalists and media
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companies occupy a smaller proportion of social media comments than individuals do,
Twitter enables even them to reach far larger audiences than their primary platforms. For
example, MSNBC-TV’s Morning Joe had an average television viewership of 896,000 in
2016 (Ziv, 2017), but host Joe Scarborough’s Twitter page had a following of more than
1.5 million. His Twitter comments (like President Trump’s) are not vetted by professional
editors and fact-checkers, and, thus, misleading or biased posts from such a mainstream
television journalist may find traction as having the imprimatur of NBC News, even
when they do not. Before Twitter, a media source or channel was rarely an individual—
and rarely a journalist who was communicating outside of the official news entity.
Walter Cronkite did not give regular opinions or interviews in outlets other than the
evening news desk at CBS. But news companies now encourage their reporters to use
Twitter and give them some latitude to express personal opinions there (Lawrence et al.,
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2013; Lasorsa et al., 2012).
Conservative journalists reported numerous widely-received and overtly negative
stories about Hillary Clinton, such as L. Todd Wood in Russia for the Washington Times,
and Jeanine Pirro at Fox News. These news celebrities have an ability to affect the overall
media agenda that is more powerful with Twitter than it is with newspapers or television
alone. This may eventually lead to an environment where a journalist (conservative or
liberal) no longer needs the media conglomerate to have a national platform and, even an
international platform, as exhibited by popular online partisan media such as
Breitbart.com, InfoWars.com and Vox.com. Traditional American news media seemed to
have given Clinton the leading edge throughout the campaign in poll reports (in spite of
daily “emails!” stories), but the Twittersphere was championing Trump. Twitter’s
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intermedia agenda-building appeared frequently on conservative mainstream outlets such
as Fox News, which also promoted Trump, but also as a direct-to-consumer platform.
The power of Twitter and various individuals seems to have outperformed the
mainstream agenda-building influence of politicians, lobbyists, media companies, and
even the candidates themselves. Trump made egregious errors in public appearances, but
frequent and colorful Twitter posts distracted the public as well as the mainstream media,
even when the sources were known to be discreditable and biased.
The sources on Twitter were varied in power but not without partisan motivations,
blatant manipulation, and easy crossing of international borders. The fact that a cache of
old Clinton emails stolen by an unknown Australian man (Julian Assange) and posted on
an Icelandic website (Wikileaks.com) traveled through Russia with the goal of becoming
plastered on the front pages of American mainstream news outlets proves that the
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builders of our media agenda are not the policymakers and politicians, as they were in the
past, but foreign entities who have mastered social media to take advantage of its hold on
American news consumers.
Twitter Topics and Tones Depend Not Just on Russians,
But Also on the Candidate
Benkler, Faris, Roberts, and Zuckerman (2017) suggested that Trump’s favorite
issue—immigration—was a prominent topic in the media agenda during the 2016
campaign. The present study found that only 4% of Twitter comments about Trump
mentioned this topic (see Table 4.3 on p. 65), and only 2.6% mentioned immigration in
the Clinton sample. This is notable not only because it contradicts what Benkler and his
colleagues discovered in mainstream media, but because the Twitter comments in this
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study came largely from non-American nations, where immigration might be considered
an important issue. Many residents of these nations have relatives in the U.S., but there
were not many posts that focused on this topic. Comments from the Trump sample here
as a whole were focused on the campaign itself (between 64% and 75% in every nation),
and personal attacks (between 13% and 20%), even in international settings.
Previous studies showed that media organizations build agendas that gain readers
through entertaining or engaging stories (Gitlin, 1980; Chang, 1998; Entman, 2008).
Findings here indicated that criminal investigations of Hillary Clinton served this purpose
for social media in the 2016 presidential campaign, fulfilling the “vulture mentality”
described by Ramanathan (2016). Some of this is due to the fact that Clinton was under
FBI scrutiny between October 28 and November 7 (for the second time since June)
regarding emails found on her assistant’s computer during an unrelated investigation of
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the assistant’s husband, Anthony Weiner (Vitkovskaya, Granados & Muyskens, 2017).
During this same period, Wikileaks founder Julian Assange gave an interview that was
heavily tweeted about by RT and picked up in other nations, in which he implied other
newly released emails showed that Clinton’s election campaign was heavily funded by
Middle Easterners who support ISIS terrorist groups. All of these email stories were
shortly disproved, but they lingered in the Twittersphere. Only three weeks earlier, a
television program had released audiotape of Trump making sexist comments about
assaulting women, but that story had long faded from the media agenda by this time, even
on Twitter. The renewed FBI inquiry and this newest release from Wikileaks were a
sputtering “October surprise” that nonetheless added fuel to Twitter comments and
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subsequently to mainstream media that Clinton remained under criminal suspicion and
that her campaign was in jeopardy.
Topics such as social issues or constitutional issues were largely absent from the
entire sample of Twitter comments, in every nation, as were topics relating to the home
nations of Twitter commenters (e.g., how might the U.S. election affect relations with
India, or with China). This was surprising, given that the topic of one’s own country
might be easily on the people’s minds and media agenda of each nation. While overall
Twitter topics were similarly dispersed in each nation—mostly about the campaign,
followed by personal attacks—the proportions of these comments varied greatly between
candidates. For example, nearly 70% of all comments about Trump focused on the
campaign, polls, and rally events, and fewer than 50% of comments about Clinton fit into
this category. For Clinton, personal attacks accounted for 39% of the comments,
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compared to only 15% of these for Trump.
Almost no mention was made in this Twitter sample regarding Donald Trump’s
comments about assaulting women, or about Trump refusing to disclose his income tax
returns. If these topics dominated the Twitter discourse earlier in October, they were long
gone by October 30, the start date of this content analysis. The timing of newsworthy
disclosures—and the ability of social media to spread the stories quickly and globally,
getting picked up by mainstream media along the way--affects their impact during the
last days of an election campaign. And there is great impact for the Twitter release of
questionable stories that quickly gain attention on other media and supersede any other
news of substance. The one who tweets last tweets hardest. And that last tweet is most
likely to be from an everyday individual, not a journalist, or even a candidate.
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The Twitter comments from individuals focused on campaign rallies and
Clinton’s emails—around the world--and subsequently so did the mainstream media
agenda. Largely unaffiliated individuals and false identities determined the topics on
social media, and journalists and news media outlets enthusiastically followed their lead.
Cobb and Elder (1972) and Dearing and Rogers (1996) would suggest that individual
Twitter users had command of the campaign agenda; in this case, social media virtually
never touched on actual issues of policy or substance.
Golder (2012) found that female political candidates in India frequently receive
much less media coverage than male candidates do, and that proved true for Twitter, not
only in India but in every country under study. Clinton’s sample was always much
smaller than the Trump sample on Twitter. It was notable that there was a complete
absence of posts about Clinton’s physical appearance, and also no mentions of Trump’s
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appearance. There were also no tweets that mentioned stereotypical female attributes (or
lack thereof), feminism, or even the novelty of a woman candidate in the United States.
Pereira and Biachi (2016) performed a critical study of the two women who ran for
election as Brazil’s president in 2010. They found that the two candidates were framed by
news media with stereotypical attributes such as fragility and religiousness, with plenty
of references to their physical appearances and no mention of their rather extensive
political experiences. This was not the case in the Twitter comments about Clinton,
where tweets focused on her being a criminal rather than her femininity or extensive
political experiences.
Jamieson (1995) suggested that the mass media are fixated on aspects of the
private life of a political candidate, and this can be useful for women who run for office
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because they often are better than men at expressing themselves. Male candidates use
more war rhetoric and toughness than women do, although Greenwood and Coker (2016)
found that partisanship superseded gender in terms of choosing such campaign rhetoric.
Yoon and Lee (2013) found that media treated female candidates equally; their study
showed that media coverage for Clinton’s 2008 primary race against Barack Obama did
not reveal gendered stereotypes, although news frames did reflect more negative
coverage for her. Wagner, Trimble, Sampert and Gerrits (2017) studied multiple elections
in Canada that had female candidates, over a period of 35 years, and found that
mainstream news media did not focus on their gender as much as they did the “novelty”
of the candidates. The frames of 2016 candidate Clinton were not that she was a novelty,
but that she was considered part of the old and corrupted “establishment.” Anderson
(2017) suggested that Clinton’s loss in 2016 was due to the fact that, even today, “every
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woman is the wrong woman” for the office of president (p. 132). Anderson proposed that
it was Trump’s “newness” and “novelty” as an outsider that overpowered Clinton’s
strengths. In other words, being a credible presidential candidate was her downfall: “Her
electability made her unelectable” (p. 133). Her qualifications for electability were
framed as being a well-connected political insider with decades of experience—qualities
necessary for a female candidate to have credibility—but that worked against Clinton in a
“change” campaign. “The problem lies with the culture rather than with the candidates”
(Anderson, p. 135).
While this study did not compare content with mainstream media or do time-lapse
analysis, post-election critiques have accused mainstream media of focusing on topics
that were not salient to voters, falsely equating particular ethical lapses, and ignoring the
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views of large American populations, even though they were evident on Twitter. The
Twitter agenda about Clinton and Trump focused heavily on the horserace and on
personal attacks, moving into second-level or attribute agenda-building, as described by
McCombs, Lopez-Escobar et al. (2000) and Kiousis et al. (2006, 2009) about earlier
political campaigns, before social media. This study expands such research on attribute
salience to social media, as well as to Twitter’s international audiences. And, more than
that, it reveals how hundreds of thousands of unidentified sources in platforms such as
Twitter can drive stories onto the mainstream media agenda and public opinion, around
the world.
Oxford Internet Institute researcher Philip Howard suggested that, even without
counting the bots, Trump was still more popular on social media than Clinton was
(Kottasova, 2016). This proved true in the present study for social media in the U.S. and
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in Russia, in the ten days prior to the 2016 election, but not true in the U.K., Brazil, India
and China. The most frequent Twitter comments in the U.K. and in Brazil were negative
ones about both candidates. The comments in India and in China were marginally more
positive for both candidates, but otherwise evenly balanced among positive, negative and
neutral tones for each candidate.
The negative comments about Clinton in the U.S. and in Russia comprised 60%
of the totals–the same proportions in each country. Negative comments about Trump did
not even come close to that number. The proportions of positive tones about Trump were
smaller but still definitive and significant: 46% of the U.S. comments and 56% of the
Russian comments were positive for Trump. As mentioned, many of the pro-Trump and
anti-Clinton comments in Russia were generated by an individual who was subsequently
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identified as a prominent public relations executive named Eliana Benador. Kiousis and
Wu (2008) identified that the efforts of such public relations counsel was effective in
decreasing negative news stories about a nation. In this case, such effort proved effective
in crossing borders and decreasing negative tones about a political candidate, Donald
Trump. There have been several studies devoted to the role of Russian influence and
social media in the 2016 election; the present one provides evidence of the tones of
comments from each nation, particularly from the most predominant sources: individuals,
journalists and news media outlets.
In the Trump sample from both the U.S. and Russia, individuals more frequently
posted positive comments about him than negative or neutral comments about him. In the
U.S., the margin for negatives over positives from individuals was small—46% were
positive and 44% were negative--whereas in Russia individuals posted 53% positive and
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only 20% negative for Trump. This is attributable to the acknowledged infiltration of
Russian social media by trolls, agents of the Kremlin, but also by Eliana Benador, the
public relations professional who tweeted 15 positive comments about Trump in the
sample of 500, more than any other single source, even more than RT.
As for Clinton comments, individuals from both nations posted overwhelmingly
negative comments (of which Benador contributed only two). Clinton comments from
individuals in the U.S. were 64% negative, and 20% positive. The individuals in Russia
posted similar proportions—56% of them were negative for Clinton and 20% were
positive. In the U.S., many individuals who slammed Clinton were clearly trolls for
Trump, such as “TrumpsMyPOTUS” with 4,200 followers, “Trumpster” with 7,000
followers, “ExposeLiberals” with 98,000 followers, and “Crossbearer” with 91,000
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followers. They posted comments accusing Clinton of being a pedophile, an ISIS terror
accomplice, and a Satanist. While some of the stories about the FBI investigation were
not indicative of actual criminal conduct, the comments posted and news story links were
framed as “Clinton in trouble again” and “Clinton under suspicion.” The tones for
Clinton reflect that there were virtually no individuals championing her victory, in any
country. There were no pseudonyms or any individual accounts who trolled against
Trump, or in favor of Clinton.
The disparaging tones about Clinton were not limited to individuals and bots.
Journalists expressed similar tones, although their numbers were fewer. In the U.S.,
journalists made only 20 tweets about Trump in the sample of 500 (most frequently
positive), and 26 comments about Clinton (mostly negative). Journalists in Russia had
far more presence on Twitter than did American journalists—they tweeted roughly three
96
times more frequently during this period. But then, only a few of them were actually
Russian. Many were American or British correspondents stationed in Moscow, and with a
pro-Trump agenda all their own. Of the 53 Russian journalists’ tweets about Trump, 77%
were positive, even more than those in the U.S. There were 89 Russian journalists’
comments about Clinton—many more than there were for Trump—but only 18% were
positive, and 63% were negative about Clinton. So, while the propagandist trolls and bots
may receive attention as swaying opinion about the American presidential candidates,
journalists with many followers provided similar influential tones, and with a wider
reach.
Media companies were slightly more neutral in the U.S. than media companies in
Russia, but not altogether neutral. In fact, as stated earlier, media companies were the
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only American source type that emerged as negative in tone toward Trump. However,
they were also equally negative in terms of Clinton. None of the source categories from
the U.S. and Russia–not individuals, not journalists, not media companies–were most
frequently positive about Clinton. Even though American mainstream media seemed to
predict a wide victory for Clinton when they published daily polls on their front pages,
social media comments were clearly leaning in the other direction. Anyone who actually
paid attention to Twitter would have seen that all sources were astonishingly in favor of
Trump, not only in Russia but in the U.S. The Twitterspheres about the American
election were eerily similar in these two nations. In other countries, however, the tones
on Twitter were more distinctive. There were notable disparities in the other nations in
this Twitter study about agenda-building for Trump and Clinton.
Twitter is Totally Different from One Nation to the Next
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Shoemaker and Reese (1991) pointed out that the agenda-building process
requires a crucial step: cultural considerations. This study aimed to assess the different
considerations in cultures other than the U.S. While Russia was a major focus due to its
role in efforts to influence the American election, this study examined Twitter in Brazil,
China, the U.K. and India, nations which have been largely excluded from previous
communications research about Twitter. Edward Hall (1976), as well as Gudykunst and
Ting-Toomey (1988) described distinctions of high context cultures; Hofstede’s (1993)
dimensions of culture include collectivism and individualism, perceptions of power
distance among populations, feminine and masculine identities, uncertainty avoidance
and the orientation of time, short-term and long-term. These and other scholars identified
collective societies such as Brazil, Russia, China and India as “high-context,” as these
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cultures rely on implicitness and subtlety in effective communication messages. The use
of Twitter, if used by legitimate members of these societies and not just by trolls or expatriate populations, introduces new patterns in communication for high-context cultures.
Members of collective cultures may find a new power or identity in acting individually
on social media, and experimenting in conversations well outside their usual collective.
Members of high context cultures also may find that social media contains a context that
is much more fluid and deceptive, as are the representations of power and authority,
whether they are fraudulent or not. Exposure to Twitter may encourage such cultures to
experiment with individuality and assertiveness. But this study shows that Twitter is in
very different stages of development around the world, where it only partially reflects
cultural contexts.
Brazil Has a Huge Twitter Population,
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But Not an Identifiable Agenda
High-context Brazil has more Twitter users than many other countries (18
million) but the sources are largely evasive and pseudonymous, and there was clear
evidence that Russian hackers had infiltrated the population here, as mentioned
previously. Media and journalists were almost completely absent in the sample from
Brazil, and scores of individual accounts appeared suspicious, particularly the 49 tweets
in the Clinton sample of 500 that linked to an NBC TV affiliate in Connecticut. In spite
of this abnormal pro-Clinton contingent, comment tones were most frequently negative
for her in Brazil. In addition, the Sysomos program presented thirty times more
comments about Trump than about Clinton in Brazil, indicating an algorithmic imbalance
that was not present in other nations. This anomaly probably reflects the interference of
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Russian influencers, as some of their false “American” Twitter identities seemed to come
through Brazil, as mentioned earlier (Shane, 2017). This does not account for those
seemingly automated and exceptional posts in favor of Clinton in Brazil, but it does
explain why tones about her remained predominantly negative—the huge number of
Trump posts from unverified and unrecognizable Twitter accounts overwhelmed
anything positive for Clinton, as well as any comments from legitimate Brazilian media
or journalists. It appears from the results of this study that residents and media
companies in Brazil are not using Twitter in any meaningful way at this time.
China Twitter is Carefully Geared to Non-Asians,
and Exceptionally Immune to Hackers
China proved an exception to the overall atmosphere on Twitter, as may have
been expected since this particular social media platform is not accessible by average
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citizens but mostly by Chinese news media and journalists and expatriate civilians. Other
studies about popular and accessible Chinese platforms such as WeChat and Weibo have
shown that social media are powerful tools for democratic discourse and activism there
(e.g., Yu & Xu, 2016; Wen, Hao & Han, 2016; Wei & O’Boyle, 2016), but this was not
evident at all on Twitter. The present study did reveal that the state-controlled media in
China were careful not to endorse one U.S. presidential candidate over another; they
maintained primarily neutral tones and minimized stories about inflammatory
accusations. Twitter comments were divided into thirds for each candidate—almost
evenly positive, neutral and negative for both Trump and Clinton. However, news media
outlets in China were different: they were more in Trump’s favor (50% of news media
posts were positive for him, more than the total China sample). As the media outlets are

99

controlled by the Chinese government, and as most individual users are westerners who
live in China, this shows that the government sanctioned more favorable Twitter
coverage for Trump than it did for Clinton, who received only 26% positive comments
from the media here, compared to 36% positive tweets in China as a whole. Eleven
percent of the comments in China came from specific journalists, a larger proportion of
journalists than in other nations. Some of these were American reporters in China, but
several, such as Sinica.com podcaster Kaiser Kuo in Beijing, are freelance journalists
who operate outside the bounds of state-controlled media, and seem to have outside
access to Twitter. Journalists who tweeted in China were 61% positive for Clinton and
only 29% positive for Trump. This is a sizable disparity from journalists’ Twitter tones in
other countries, as well as the opposite proportion as those posted by official Chinese
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state media outlets, but it reflects that many journalists in China were reporting different
tones than those in other nations.
Different from Chinese news media, journalists on Twitter in China were more
negative about Trump and more positive about Clinton than their counterparts anywhere
else in the world. While this may be the result of the unique distinction in control over
media coverage in China and relatively independent journalists, this imbalance in tone
may also reflect public opinion and media bias in the one nation that seemed to have had
no infiltration or manipulation by outside influence. While few westerners would suggest
that Communist control of Chinese media is a good thing, strict regulation does appear to
keep out hackers and bots. Government rules for Weibo ban anonymous users, false
stories, violence, pornography (and political dissent). The government is proud that such
control has allowed China’s internet companies to grow without foreign rivals, and also
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without foreign infiltration (Myers and Wee, 2017). Other, more democratic nations will
be contending with hackers and insidious propaganda for years to come. Freedom of the
press comes with a price.
Twitter Users in the UK Are Engaged in U.S. Politics, and Nationalism
The only other population in this study who regularly use the target language—
English—is, of course, in the United Kingdom. In fact, the Twitter account for the BBC
(British Broadcasting Corporation) was the most-followed single source in this study,
with more than 32 million. This is impressive considering it is the smallest nation
represented in this study, and its total Twitter parameter is only 14 million. The tones
from the U.K. were 41% negative for Trump and 42% negative for Clinton, making it the
only nation that tweeted equivalent negative tone proportions about both American
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candidates. But when examining the Twitter comment tones of news media outlets in the
U.K., they were far less negative for Trump--only 28% negative about him, whereas 32%
of news media tweets were positive for him. This imbalance for media source tones may
be due to popular conservative journalists in the U.K. such as Paul Joseph Watson, who is
not a media outlet but who frequently posted links to InfoWars and his caustic American
media compatriot, Alex Jones.
Clinton tones remained predominantly negative for all U.K. sources, many of
whom were from individual trolls such as “Israel Bombs Babies,” which posted 26
negative posts about her in the sample of 500. This is the only nation that posted many
tweets about Trump’s potential collusion with Russian interests, as well as about Trump’s
history of sexual assaults and secretive tax returns. These topics simply did not appear in
other nations. However, like the U.S., the U.K. also posted many stories about Wikileaks
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and its inflammatory accusations about Clinton, which overwhelmed any negative
balance for Trump. The positive and negative proportions of tones were less extreme in
the U.K. than in other countries, in total; this may be due to the fact that, as a nation, it
was not a target of or avenue for Russian bots and Trump trolls. It may also reflect British
attitudes on the heels of its recent vote to exit the European Union only a few weeks
earlier. Some posts compared Trump’s successful candidacy to the popular “Brexit”
movement, and there were a few cautionary posts addressing the down side of
conservative nationalism.
India Media are Masters of Twitter
Guo and Vargo (2017) found that a nation’s political and economic status
predicted its salience in the world news, and also that, in the digital age, the U.S. was
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becoming less and less the center of media attention. They also found that India was
rising in media exports, and this study certainly found that media in India had a larger
share of tweets than they did in other nations—more than 20% of the Twitter comments
about both candidates came from news media sources. India is the world’s largest
democracy, and also the world’s largest media industry. Guo and Vargo (2017) and
Tunstall (2008) asserted that media exports in nations such as India have risen to the top
of the “world media pecking order” (Tunstall, p. 235), which was confirmed in this study
by the strong presence of India’s media outlets on the Twitter agenda. Until the 1990s,
Indian television news had been controlled by the government, so it is a relatively young
news medium there (Thomas & Kumar, 2004). Its emergence in the international arena is
enhanced by social media, where the relatively youthful TV news media, as well as the
well established Indian print news media, show great presence. These Indian media
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sources propagated a relatively more even balance of tone on Twitter between the
American presidential candidates, but the Indian news media accounts on Twitter were
still largely positive comments for Trump (40% of the time) and most frequently negative
for Clinton (in 53% of Indian news media tweets). Individuals in India were more
positive about Trump and more negative about Clinton than were the news media tweets
in India. The high-context culture of India was leaning towards the partisan,
individualistic tones of low-context Americans. Some of this may be due to the wide use
of English language in Indian media, a residual of the British Raj. But the slant towards
Trump may also be reflective of emerging partisanship in India itself. India has a popular
but controversial Prime Minister (Narendra Modi) from a conservative party who is
perceived as anti-Muslim, and many draw similarities between this leader and Donald
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Trump (Crunden, 2017). Championing an American candidate who was against
immigrants and trade imports was not necessarily in India’s best interests, but the other
qualities in Trump regarding nationalism may have served to confirm for Indians the
benefits of those values in Modi.
Twitter is an evolving but increasingly important element of agenda-building in
media around the world. Social media provides exponentially more exposure for
mainstream media as well as for motivated groups and individuals who can easily
disseminate misinformation and propaganda and feed it to mainstream journalists and
news outlets. While Twitter may provide a vehicle for dangerous political influence by
some nations, it also provides a new platform for influence by mainstream news media,
average citizens, journalists and public relations professionals. This study provides
foundational information about social media in international settings, for political
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communication and for 21st century agenda-building, which will continue to grow and
evolve as does the nature of Twitter. Social media has been hailed for the past decade as a
pathway to a more democratic public sphere, but growing pains show that it is vulnerable
and in danger of weakening news credibility. Mainstream media may provide Twitter
with content and legitimacy, but these news outlets must also contend with the
ramifications of trustworthiness among consumers and counter the reputation for “fake
news” on social media.
The Shorenstein study suggested that journalists were fascinated with Trump
because their decisions were driven by news values, not by political values (Patterson,
2016). Journalists and media companies want to feature topics and people that are
unusual and sensational. Findings of the present study suggest that their agenda may also
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be driven by individuals posting on Twitter, because they and their posts in themselves
are unusual and sensational. Armed with knowledge such as this study, journalists and
media companies—as well as government agencies and internet companies--will have
resources to address the challenges of providing influence to any Twitter user, and to
create media agendas that have the capacity to threaten the free press and other
democratic institutions.
Limitations and Implications
There are a number of limitations to this study, including the fact that Twitter has
shown to be manipulated by individuals and groups who misrepresent their identities,
particularly about a powerful political topic. While the presence of bots and trolls were
identified and somewhat accounted for, there may have been many remaining identities
that were falsified. In addition, the keywords and topic selected for this study were
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centered on an American event which may have held variable importance to Twitter users
around the world. In addition, Twitter users are a self-selecting group and, in this case,
English language users, and may not be representative of the nations or their media. The
sample size was also a limitation, as it was a small percentage of Twitter comments, in
some nations more than in others. The numbers of specific journalists and media outlets
in the sample were even smaller, roughly 20% of the total, making some of the
interpretations less than generalizable
Another challenge of examining Twitter is the “echo chamber,” where consumers
see a feedback loop in a filtered bubble, with little or no exposure to followers who are
not like-minded (Jamieson & Cappella, 2008). Gabler (2016) called this phenomenon
“segmentation,” which allows consumers to find niche media, and no longer are forced to
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find commonality in general media such as “stodgy” broadcast television (n.p.).
Goldenberg (1984) once said: “With regularized interactions, sources and reporters enter
a bargaining relationship in which each actor extends efforts to interact with the other” to
create a news product that is a subjective construction, and defined by the various sources
(p. 236). Academic studies in agenda-building were founded on the normatively
appealing mainstream media and traditional policymakers, but agenda-building is
evolving as new media evolves: the public not only chooses its preferred social media
outlets but also, now, creates the stories, disseminates them, and sends them to reporters.
This study revealed that Twitter provided a massive platform for special interests
to influence and affect the outcome of an American presidential election, from parties
around the world. While news about Russian infiltration continues to emerge, this study
provides greater detail and insight into the specific nature of the ethical breaches in
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agenda-building on Twitter, as well as observations about other international and
influential Twitter comments regarding Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton in the 2016
American presidential election. This study confirms that individuals—as well as
international powers—can quite easily influence public opinion by simply typing very
short messages on Twitter, the accessible, mobile and global soapbox.
Future Research
Communications research about Twitter is still relatively new, yet before we even
fully understand the platform and its effects, it is already evolving to reflect manipulation
and questionable ethics, which must be studied and remedied. New applications and news
media platforms will be continue to be created regularly, and these will further influence
consumers and news professionals, as Twitter has done.
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Future studies may employ time-lapse analysis to see the direction of agendabuilding between social media and mainstream media during this campaign, and during
other events of international scope. The agenda-building process involves many factors,
particularly in various cultures where Twitter is not as commonly used as it is in the U.S.
Further research may use other social media platforms, particularly WhatsApp and Weibo
which are used more often by consumers in Asia than Twitter is.
Research is also recommended to examine behavioral responses to social media,
such as voting behavior and donating money to a cause, as well as the effects of partisan
media and “fake news” on social media. In addition, studies will need to ferret out the
“secret” agendas propagated on social media by special interest groups, politicians, racist
groups and terrorists: elections are not the only opportunity for Twitter to serve as a
media agenda builder. In addition, it is notable that the sample sizes here for Clinton
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comments were all much smaller than those for Trump, due either to the hackers in
Russia or, as suggested earlier, due to the lack of equal media coverage for female
politicians. Future studies may include Twitter in performing research on gender and
political communication. This study also exposed disparities in Twitter characteristics in
nations such as Brazil, indicating a need for more international studies involving social
media. While mobile internet access is transforming remote and rural populations in
nations such as China with Weibo and WhatsApp, there would be benefits to exploring
the influence of social media on other developing nations, not only in South America but
also in Africa, among many other places that are gaining new access to social media, and
also thus to American politics. Studies such as this one help communications researchers
and consumers to build greater awareness of the validity of news stories and sources, and
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to nurture new generations of citizens around the world who understand the importance
and the power of social media.
Meanwhile, more studies may be needed about Facebook and Google, companies
which, like Twitter, are being investigated more intensely after U.S. authorities learned
that these entities sold advertisements to Russian entities during the campaign
(Applebaum, 2017), some of which focused less on the American candidates than on
causing racial unrest and propagating civic strife in the U.S. Russians realized sooner
than others did that “social media campaigns are a cheap way for an impoverished exsuperpower to meddle in other countries’ politics (Applebaum, 2017, n.p.). Researchers,
educators, as well as the companies who create social media platforms, must continue to
address the challenges of global social media. Our foundational communications theories,
such as agenda-building, prove their value in supporting research that helps people safely
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navigate online news stories and trustworthy sources. The technology itself exposes
people to the ability to communicate with a multitude of cultures they might never
otherwise encounter. Continued research will enhance our understanding of other
societies and their means of communicating, which may even provide elements to
remediate the dynamic technological challenges and vulnerabilities of Twitter. More
than ever before, lies and fake news travel around the world “while the truth is still
pulling on its boots.” As social media expands its reach with 21st century innovations, it
is the responsibility of researchers, technological experts, and professional news outlets
to keep its contents credible and culturally aware.
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